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The Opacity of Transparency
Mark Fenster*
ABSTRACT: The normative concept of transparency, along with the open
government laws that purport to create a transparent public system of
governance, promises the moon--a democratic and accountable state above
all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well. But transparency,
in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands,
frustrates all parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions. The
public's engagement with transparency in practice yields denials of
reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as
government meetings that occur behind closed doors. Meanwhile, state
officials bemoan the significantly impaired decision-making processes that
result from complying with transparency's sweeping and powerful legal
mandates and complain about transparency 's enormous compliance costs.
This Article argues that the frustrations with creating an open government
originate in the concept of "transparency" itself, which fails to consider the
tensions it conceals. The easy embrace of transparency as a basis for
normative and utilitarian ends evades more difficult questions. When is
transparency most important as an administrative norm? To what extent
should an agency be held to that norm? Open government laws fall short in
answering these questions because, relying on the assumptions of
"transparency," they typically operate at exceptionally high levels of
abstraction. As a result, they establish both broad mandates for disclosure
and broad authority for the exercise of a state privilege of non-disclosure,
and they ultimately fail to produce an effective, mutually acceptable level of
administrative openness. Transparency theory's flaws result from a
simplistic model of linear communication that assumes that information,
once set free from the state that creates it, will produce an informed, engaged
public that will hold officials accountable. To the extent that this model fails
to describe accurately the state, government information, and the public, as
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and suggestions along the way from colleagues and friends including Tom Cotter, Heidi
Kitrosser, Lyrissa Lidsky, Lars Noah, Bill Page, and Larry Solum, and many thanks to Robert
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well as the communications process of which they are component parts, it
provides a flawed basis for open government laws.
This Article critiques the assumptions embedded in transparency theory and
suggests an alternative approach to open government laws that would allow
a more flexible, sensitive means to evaluate the costs and benefits of
information disclosure. It also proposes institutional alternatives to the
current default regime in open government laws, which relies on weak
judicial enforcement of disclosure mandates, and offers substantive
suggestions that would improve efforts to establish a more accountable state
and an informed public.
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INTRODUCTION
By any commonsense estimation, governmental transparency, defined
broadly as a governing institution's openness to the gaze of others,' is clearly
2among the pantheon of great political virtues. A fundamental attribute of
democracy, 3 a norm of human rights, 4 a tool to promote political and
economic prosperity and to curb corruption,5 and a means to enable
effective relations between nation states,6 transparency appears to provide
1. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 419 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "transparent," in its
figurative uses, as both "[f]rank, open, candid, ingenuous," and "[elasily seen through,
recognized, understood, or detected").
2. For purposes of this Article, except where noted otherwise, I use "transparency" to
refer to the openness of the federal and state executive branches to the public. Openness is also
an issue in other contexts, such as between branches of the government (and particularly
between Congress and the President), between the judiciary and the public, and between
corporations and their shareholders (as well as the public). It also arises when the government
attempts to punish whistleblowers or stop the circulation of leaked information. While my
discussion of transparency may be applicable in some respects to those other contexts, each
raises many distinct theoretical and legal issues and all are outside this Article's scope. On the
interbranch informational dispute, see, for example, William P. Marshall, The Limits on
Congress's Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781. On efforts to impose
transparency norms on corporations for the general public good, see MARY GRAHAM,
DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM (2002); Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-
24 (1999); Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies
Sustainable? (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Faculty Research Working Papers Series No.
RWP03-039 (2004)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=384922. On the value of
transparency for the corporation itself and its shareholders, see DON TAPSCOTT & DAVID
TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION 62-93 (2003). But see Get Naked, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 18,
2003, at 66 (noting doubts as to whether absolute transparency would make a functional, better
corporation). On the constitutional basis for public access to court proceedings, see Jonathan
L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV.
265, 269-89 (2004). On federal statutory protections for whistleblowers, and especially the
weakness of those protections, see Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989:
Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531 (1999); and on the
difficult burden of government efforts to restrain publication of leaked information, see New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (rejecting, in the Pentagon
Papers case, prior restraint on publication despite the government's claim of significant threats
to national security).
3. See infra Part I.A.1.
4. See TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY, at iii-vii
(2003), available at http://www.articlel9.org/docimages/1707.pdf; Stephen Sedley, Information
as a Human Right, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 239 (Jack Beatson
& Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000).
5. See Robert Martin & Estelle Feldman, Access to Information in Developing Countries ch. 5
(Apr. 1998) (Working Paper, Transparency International), available at http://
www.transparency.org/working-papers/martin-feldman/5-why-develop.html.
6. See Frederick M. Abbott, NAFI'A and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study, 54
INT'L ORG. 519, 529-31 (2000); Alasdair Roberts, A Partial Revolution: The Diplomatic Ethos and
Transparency in Intergovernmental Organizations, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 410 (2004).
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such a remarkable array of benefits that no right-thinking politician,
administrator, policy wonk, or academic could be against it.7 But
transparency is not merely a political norm; candidates, partisans, and
activists utilize it as a rhetorical weapon to promise full-scale political and
social redemption.' Contentious political campaigns and popular political
consciousness seethe with allegations that government officials engage in
secret, corrupt activities (if not full-scale conspiracies) and overflow with
promises that sufficient organization, popular will, and correct leadership
will finally provide citizens with the responsive, trustworthy, and above all,
knowable government they deserve.
Nevertheless, transparency's status as a legal obligation for government
entities in the United States and as an individual right for American citizens
is remarkably vague. And notwithstanding occasional periods of openness,
7. On transparency's emergence in the past decade as a core concept of governance, see
Thomas Blanton, The World's Right to Know, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 2002, at 50.
8. See Geoffrey H. Hartman, A Note on Plain Speech and Transparency, 14 LAW &
LITERATURE 25, 28 (2002) (sarcastically characterizing transparency as promising an
authenticity that will allow the truth to "rise to the surface like cream, and so to abolish the
esoteric in human contact and communication").
9. There is no individual right of access to government information in the U.S.
Constitution. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger,
C.J.); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Manogg v. Stickle, 181 F.3d 102 (6th Cir.
1999); Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy--Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought
About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 51, 74-76 (2002). But cf Heidi
Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right To Know in the
Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 125-45 (2004) (arguing that access rights fall
under liberal democratic conceptions of free speech rights as enabling self-government and
checking government abuses, and thus should receive First Amendment protection). The
Supreme Court has found a limited First Amendment fight of access to criminal trials and pre-
trial proceedings, however. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81
(1980). Congress is subject to some constitutional transparency requirements in the Journal
Clause, which mandates that each house keep a "Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy," and,
where one-fifth of those present at a vote agree, record the results of any vote. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 3. For a fuller treatment of congressional transparency, see Adrian Vermeule, The
Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 361, 410-22 (2004).
Federal statutory open-government laws require disclosure of federal records and
open meetings, with enumerated exceptions. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (requiring, with exceptions, that each federal agency make information
available to the public upon request); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(2000) (requiring, with exceptions, that every meeting of an agency be open to public
observation). Some states have adopted constitutional provisions granting a right to access,
while all have statutes that perform functions analogous to the federal FOIA and Government
in the Sunshine Acts. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3(b)(1) (granting "the right of access to
information concerning the conduct of the people's business"); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24
(granting "the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with
the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on
their behalf"); Laura Schenck, Note, Freedom of Information Statutes: The Unfulfilled Legacy, 48 FED.
COMM. L.J. 371, 372-73 n.7 (1996) (listing state freedom of information statutes).
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government seems eternally resistant to disclosure.'0 Current political
developments-specifically, the Bush Administration's efforts to control the
flow of information from the executive branch 1 and post-September 11
concerns that government information disclosures might breach homeland
security 2-portend a new period of "retrenchment" (one begun during the
10. For accounts of the federal government's resistance to disclosure, see Thomas
Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond the Balancing Test, in
NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33, 34-54 (2003);
Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1195, 1201 (2004). The best evidence of generalized frustration at the state level is the
existence of the National Freedom of Information Coalition, an organized network of member
groups around the country that advocate for stronger open government laws and endeavor to
force state and local agencies to comply with them. See Nat'l Freedom of Info. Coal., Our
Mission, http://www.nfoic.org/Mission.html (last visited March 11, 2006).
11. One recent self-described "polemic" that summarizes the allegations and arguments
relating to the Bush Administration's efforts to control government information is JOHN W.
DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH xiv (2004); see
alsoJohn D. Podesta, Shadow Creep: Government Secrecy Since 9/11, 2002 U. ILL.J.L. TECH. & POL'Y
361, 370-72 (criticizing the Bush Administration's approach to government secrecy, both
before and after the events of September 11, 2001); Bradley Pack, Note, FOIA Frustration: Access
to Government Records Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 823-27 (2004)
(criticizing the Bush Administration's actions during the post-9/11 period).
12. See Nancy Chang, How Democracy Dies: The War on Our Civil Liberties, in LOST LIBERTIES:
ASHCROF AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 33, 36-39 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003);
Stephen Gidiere & Jason Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 139 (2002); Wells, supra note 10, at 1197; Keith Anderson, Note, Is
There Still a "Sound Legal Basis"?: The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 4 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1605 (2003); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11:
Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM.
U. L. REv. 261 (2003).
Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration has withdrawn
information from public access about certain immigration cases and publications that had
previously been available from federal government websites and has sought to tighten access to
information relating to weapons of mass destruction and "other information that could be
misused to harm the security of our nation or threaten public safety." Patrice McDermott,
Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 672-74
(2003); Andrew Card, Guidance on Homeland Security Information Issued (Mar. 19, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapostI0.htm; FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CON.,
LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
INFORMATION (2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/sbu.pdf. During the first term of the
George W. Bush Administration, the number of documents classified increased considerably
more than it did during the Clinton Administration, while the number of documents
declassified decreased in a corresponding fashion. See Gregg Sangillo, Incarceration of
Information?, NAT'LJ., Oct. 23, 2004, at 3227-28. Congress has also expanded executive agency
powers to withhold information from the public. Critics allege that the Critical Information
Infrastructure Act, passed as part of the Homeland Security Act, will inhibit disclosure of
information about the risks and safety hazards posed by utilities, gas pipeline operations, and
similar industrial infrastructure that had previously been available under state and federal law.
See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 214, 6 U.S.C. § 133; John Gibeaut, The Paperwork War on
Terrorism, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2003, at 63, 67-68; Brett Stohs, Protecting the Homeland by Exemption: Why
the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Will Degrade the Freedom of Information Act, 2002
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latter years of the Clinton Administration) in the oft-delayed march towards
transparency's promise." The Bush Administration may occasionally express
its commitment to openness,14 as do most courts when they review
challenges to government agencies' refusals to disclose information.'5 But
when executive officers and agencies routinely deny access to the
government's inner workings on the grounds that some exception or other
privilege overrides a statutory disclosure requirement, open government
seems more like a distant, deferred ideal than an actually existing practice.1
6
This regular departure from a principle that is so universally embraced
seems bizarre. But it gets worse. All parties to the uncertain reach of
transparency find the legal obligations and enforcement mechanisms of
open government laws to be immensely frustrating." In the federal and state
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/
2002DLTR0018.pdf.
13. See Blanton, supra note 10, at 51-54 (describing secrecy during the current Bush
Administration, and arguing that it began during Clinton's second term); Jonathan Turley,
Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REv. 205
(2001) (condemning the Clinton Administration's reliance on sweeping executive privilege
claims to keep information about White House activities secret).
14. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft on the Freedom of Information Act to the
Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm (declaring that "[i]t is only through a well-informed
citizenry that the leaders of our nation remain accountable to the governed and the American
people can be assured that neither fraud nor government waste is concealed" while also
advising agencies that the Department of Justice will defend decisions to deny FOIA requests
"unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the
ability of other agencies to protect other important records").
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (noting that
"[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable
to the governed" before proceeding to affirm denial of a FOIA request on the ground that the
witness statements in an unfair labor practices hearing before the National Labor Relations
Board fell within a FOIA exception because their release would interfere with enforcement
proceedings); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (characterizing FOIA as "broadly conceived"
and intended "to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public
view and . . .to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from
possibly unwilling official hands" before proceeding to hold that an agency's classification of
documents may not be reviewed by a court in camera).
16. With respect to matters of national security and foreign policy, for example, most
challenges to agency denials to disclose documents end at the summary judgment stage, when
courts typically defer to agency affidavits stating the applicability of FOIA exemption (b) (1). See
1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 11:11, at 524-25 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000)). And as a political matter, disappointment among
disclosure advocates about the disjunction between the public statements of presidents in favor
of openness and their actual efforts to keep information secret dates back to the earliest years of
FOIA. See Elias Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84
YALE L.J. 741, 746 (1975) (describing the contradictory words and actions of Presidents Johnson
and Nixon, the first executives following FOIA's enactment).
17. By "open government laws," I mean to focus specifically on federal statutes that
require public access to government documents and the meetings of federal agencies. The two
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systems, those who request information under the various freedom of
information and "sunshine" statutes regularly face delays and blanket
denials." The result of one recent poll sponsored by open government
advocates found widespread public concern that government secrecy is
pervasive and that the public has too little access to public records and
meetings.'9 At the same time, agencies engaged in law enforcement,
defense, and national security consider open government laws to be at best a
burden and, at worst, a threat to their work.2" Moreover, the financial and
administrative costs of complying with these laws are significantly greater
than zero, and these costs may adversely affect the ability of all federal, state,
and local agencies to make effective decisions in a rational, deliberative, and
efficient manner.21 One could dismiss these competing concerns as
complaints about the unavoidable costs and inefficiencies of democracy and
the inevitable limits required to maintain a secure nation and functional
government. But, to return to the widespread recognition of its status as a
preeminent political norm, if transparency is so essential, why do we settle
for less than its perfection? Why must we worry about its costs?
The problem posed by these questions and the frustrations with the
open government laws that the questions represent originates in the concept
of "transparency" itself. As both an instrumentalist project to achieve open
government and, more broadly, a descriptive concept claimed to be at the
core of democracy, transparency fails to consider the tensions it conceals. It
assumes too much of the state, of government information, and of the
public, and as a result, fails to produce or to helpfully inform an effective,
mutually acceptable level of administrative openness. The easy embrace of
most prominent such laws are the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), and the
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). Although I focus mostly on federal
statutes, I also refer to state constitutional and statutory provisions requiring analogous public
access to the operations and documents of state government.
18. See Michele Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians'Decision-Making Behaviors
in Response to Florida's Public Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 313, 314-16 (2003) (describing
widespread noncompliance of state and local government agencies with state disclosure laws);
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF T1-E PRESS, HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON
TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 71-80 (6th ed.
2005), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential/foreword.html (describing the
increasing resistance of federal agencies to responding to FOIA requests following September
11); Freedom of Info. Ctr., Mo. Sch. of Journalism, Audits and Surveys of State Freedom of
Information Laws (Feb. 20, 2005), http://foi.missouri.edu/openrecseries/index.html
(summarizing audits of state and local government responses to requests made under state
freedom of information laws that show variable, but largely imperfect, compliance).
19. See Andy Alford, It's the Law: Texans Can't Be Kept in the Dark, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Mar. 13, 2005, at Al.
20. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 922-23 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (describing affidavits filed by the Department of
Justice and FBI officials asserting that disclosure of information on identities of detainees held
following September 11 would harm ongoing law enforcement efforts and national security).
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
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transparency as a basis for normative and instrumental ends evades more
difficult questions: When is transparency most important as an
administrative norm? To what extent should an agency be held to that
norm? These challenging but necessary questions typically lead transparency
proponents and open government laws to concede a set of exceptions to
disclosure that are just as broad and, ironically, just as opaque as the
transparency norms themselves. Thus, where disclosure requirements
threaten to reveal information regarding national security, national defense,
and law enforcement investigations, the positive norms of transparency must
give way to state claims for the need to hoard information for the public
safety and good. These exceptions, in turn, unravel the ideal of transparency
by vesting broad discretion about whether and how much to disclose in the
very state actors that have claimed the exceptions in the first place.22
The result is a ritualistic struggle over openness and privilege, with
grave consequences. An overly broad conception of transparency with
similarly broad exceptions too often leads to excessive openness
requirements placed upon some levels of government and administrative
decisions and too rarely leads to effective openness requirements when the
state makes its most important, irreversible commitments to a particular
policy. Furthermore, a legislative or constitutional commitment to
transparency does not magically lead to the informed, deliberative, and/or
participatory public that advocates claim will arise when the state finally
disgorges its secrets. "Transparency," used in its strongest and most abstract
form in the context of open government, acts as a term of opacity that
promises more than it can deliver and ultimately fails to further its stated
end of a better, more responsive, and truly democratic government. Rather
than abstract normative claims and rhetoric, what is needed is some realism
about transparency's costs and benefits for the public, for governance, and
for the relationship between the public and government.
Abandoning transparency in its broadest conceptual form does not,
however, require abandoning a commitment to open government and
democracy. Rather, recognizing transparency's limits forces us to recognize
the practical limits of imposing open government requirements on a
bureaucratic state to which we delegate significant authority and of which we
have high expectations. As a general matter, any effort to regulate disclosure
must clearly and, as much as possible, precisely account for both the relative
costs and benefits of openness. What kinds of governmental decisions and
political participation are most likely to benefit from transparency? What
kinds of costs and dangers will government officials and institutions face as a
result of meeting transparency requirements? The implications of such an
accounting for transparency rules have not been sufficiently considered;
instead, transparency advocates and skeptics talk past each other within the
22. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 115 (1982).
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stale, abstract discourse of transparency theory, in which each normative and
consequential claim faces an equally valid counter-claim.
This Article seeks to begin asking the questions above by rethinking
transparency as a concept. It begins with a survey of the literature on
transparency's meaning as a component of political theory, law, and policy.
Part I summarizes the arguments in favor of and against strong forms of
transparency imposed on government entities and describes the conceptions
of transparency's necessity and limits that are built into democratic theory.
The Article characterizes the ground shared by these arguments as
comprising a "transparency theory" that provides an underlying justification
and framework for open government laws. Part II explains transparency
theory and the balance it attempts to strike between the thrust of disclosure
requirements and the parry of governmental privilege claims. Part III
critiques that balance by identifying, explicating, and demystifying the
simplistic model of linear communication that itself underlies contemporary
transparency theory. It argues that transparency theory fails to comprehend
the complexities of bureaucracy, communication, and the public, and that
as a result, disclosure laws exclusively focus on the processes of information
production and the types of information produced. Part 1V suggests an
alternative approach to open government laws that would allow more
flexible, sensitive means to evaluate the costs and benefits of information
disclosure. It suggests that decisions about disclosure should focus on more
precise considerations of the costs and benefits from disclosure to
governmental and public decision-making, rather than on broad normative
concepts and categories of government information. Part IV also argues in
favor of considering the timeliness and comprehensibility of information
disclosures and proposes institutional alternatives to the current default
regime in open government laws, which relies on weakjudicial enforcement
of disclosure mandates.
I. "TRANSPARENCY"
The arguments in favor of transparency seem fairly commonsensical
and perhaps even obvious, at least in part because an informed citizenry and
an open, accessible government are essential elements of liberal democratic
theory and are more consistent with modern Western political values than
23the alternative of secret government and an ignorant public. As a general
matter, proponents make two claims on behalf of transparency: first, a
government that is more transparent is therefore more democratic; and
second, a government that is more transparent will operate in a more
effective and efficient manner, and will thereby better serve its citizens while
dealing more fairly and peaceably with other nations. In this Part, I first
summarize these sets of claims and then present some of the most trenchant
23. See EDwARD A. SHILs, THE TORMENT OF SECREcY 23-24 (1956).
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criticisms of them. Critics argue that strong forms of transparency
requirements are neither essential nor beneficial to a democratic republic,
which in its constitutional structure can correct any governmental abuses-
either internally through checks and balances or externally through
elections-without the dangers and inefficiencies that excessive openness
creates.
A. TRANSPARENCY'S BEEFrs
1. Democratic Benefits
Contemporary transparency advocates typically draw connections
between their efforts and the beginnings of modern liberal democratic
theory in order to make the argument that open government is an essential
element of a functional liberal democracy. James Madison's statement in an
1821 letter that "[a] popular Government, without popular information, or
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both,"24 serves as the quote most often used by authors to
demonstrate the foundational nature of transparency in modern democratic
theory and in the American constitutional scheme. 25 But one can find
similar, if not quite as pithy, sentiments in the classical liberalism of Locke,26
Mill,2 7 and Rousseau 28 in both Benthamite utilitarian philosophy29 and
24. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON:
His BASIC WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("[A] people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.").
25. A recent Westlaw search for the quotation in the "Journals and Law Reviews" database
found 201 full quotations, almost entirely within articles asserting the need for open
government. See, e.g.,Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence
of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 651, 652 (2003) (using a quote in the opening sentence to support the
argument that presidential papers should be seen as inherently public property); Paul
Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 551, 551-52 (2000) (using a quote in the fourth paragraph of the brief article
warning of anti-democratic possibilities of media consolidation). Such use extends backwards to
criticisms of secrecy in the Reagan and Nixon eras. See MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N.
HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 106 (1977); STEVEN L.
KATZ, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 2 (1987).
However, these uses of Madison's homily to support transparency may obscure the
quotation's origins. According to one recent account, Madison intended the oft-cited sentences
as part of an effort to support education-the "popular knowledge" of the quotation serving as
an exhortation to a Kentucky professor seeking support for public school funding-rather than
to support disclosure of government information, as has been supposed throughout the past
fifty years. See Michael Doyle, Misquoting Madison, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 16, 16-18.
26. See AJUME H. WINGO, VEIL POLITICS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATES 16-18 (2003)
(discussing the importance of transparency in Locke's First Treatise of Government).
27. SeeJOHN STUART MILL, Considerations of Representative Democracy, in UTILITARIANISM: ON
LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 262 (H.B. Action ed., 1972)
(1861).
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Kantian moral philosophy," as well as in the statements of other framers of
the American Constitutionl--even if the framers' own deliberations over
the Constitution were rather less than fully transparent. 32 Bentham, for
example, argued that publicity enables closer relations between the state
and its public by securing the confidence of the governed in the legislature,
by facilitating communication between the state and the public, and by
33
creating a more informed electorate. If fully knowledgeable of government
workings, the public can play its proper roles as enlightened tribunal and
collective decisionmaker whose "national intelligence," trust, and attention
lend "confidence and security" to "open and free policy."s
Following these principles, contemporary political theorists place the
publicity of government laws and actions at the core of democracy because it
enables both the rational choice of the individual citizen and the full
flowering of informed public debate by the collective. Liberal philosophers
who assume a contractual relationship between government and its citizens
presume that openness enables individuals to grant their informed consent
to be governed. The Rawlsian original position, for example, identifies
publicity as a necessary condition for the creation of a just society because it
allows individuals to choose, in a rational and knowledgeable manner, the
principles for a society with which they would agree to associate. 5 The
individual's choice must be informed for the thought experiment of the
original position to be meaningful. Similarly, Rawls's political liberalism
requires that free and equal citizens fully understand and scrutinize society's
institutions rather than misconceive the political order due to "accidental or
28. SeeJEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Dedication to the Republic of Geneva, in DISCOURSE ON THE
ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 32-33 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988).
29. SeeJEREMy BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29-44 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999).
30. See Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 470 (Carl J. Friedrich
ed., 1949).
31. See Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of Information in the United States, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
38-46 (1971); David Mitchell Ivester, Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 109, 120-34 (1977). Nevertheless, the framers neither intended nor considered the First
Amendment to prohibit government secrecy or to create a constitutional right to information
access. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv.
927, 933 (1992); Wallace Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under
the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1957).
32. See J.R. Pole, Introduction to THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST:
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 18 U.R. Pole ed., 1987); see atsoJon Elster, Arguing and
Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 345, 410-12 (2000) (arguing that
the closed constitutional convention in the American colonies provided distinct advantages for
the constitutional framing).
33. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 29-34.
34. Id.
35. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16, 454 (1971). For Rawls, publicity is also a
constituent element of the well-ordered society, whose citizens must know and comprehend the
society's basic structure and political and social institutions. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 35 (1993).
[2006]
THE OPACITY OF TRANSPARENCY
established delusions, or other mistaken beliefs resting on the deceptive
appearances of institutions that mislead us as to how they work."0
6
Indeed, formal notions of the rule of law, whether they emphasize a
Rawlsian just state or a Hayekian minimalist one 37 require self-enacting,
publicly accessible, and comprehensible legislation that limits and confines
all exercise of public authority, and that facilitates the private ordering of
individual behavior as a result.38 Only to the extent that these laws gain the
consent of the governed-which itself can only be freely given if the laws
and their enforcement are public-will the political and administrative
authorities that enact and enforce these laws be legitimate: Proponents of
deliberative democracy share the contractarians' commitment to publicity,
asserting that transparent reasoning and decisionmaking by a representative
body enable public discussion and the broadening of citizens' and officials'
moral and political perspectives.4 0 A deliberative understanding of the
publicity principle requires that government give public justifications for its
policies4' and promote rational, critical public debate and unrestricted
communication in order to enable development of a functional, democratic
public sphere.42 In short, liberal democratic theory requires the state to give
an account of itself to its public and to justify its actions to the individual and
community.
43
Legislative and judicial efforts to curb government secrecy and protect
informed individual choice, public debate, and state self-justification harness
this liberal democratic concept of transparency's benefits. Consider, for
example, the normative presumptions upon which Congress relied in
36. RAWIS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 35, at 68.
37. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 74-75 (1944); RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 238. William Sage has connected transparency as a concept with
libertarian politics, arguing that transparency rhetoric, in the context of health-care disclosure,
operates as part of a "resurgent rhetoric of individualism and self-reliance in American politics,
reflecting diminished expectations of government and heightened skepticism regarding public
programs and public institutions," despite widespread public distrust of the market and of
concentrations of corporate power. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707 (1999).
38. See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Introduction to FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, at xi, xv-xvi
(Robert G. Vaughn ed., 2000) (discussing how approaches to administrative law that privilege
the formal rule of law understand the need for open government).
39. In this sense, the argument for transparency resembles arguments in favor of
administrative reform that invoke a strict conception of the rule of law. See generally Thomas 0.
Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 385, 397-99 (summarizing the rule of law ideal of the administrative process).
40. See AMY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 100-01
(1996); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193-94 (Jon
Elster ed., 1998).
41. GUTT7MAN & THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 101.
42. JfJRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 208-09 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (1962).
43. SeeJAMES G. MARCH &JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 146-48 (1995).
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passing the original Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") in 1966. The
House of Representatives Report on the original legislation rested its
conclusion about the necessity of a broader, more exacting public access law
on the fact that "[a] democratic society requires an informed, intelligent
electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and
quality of its information varies."44 Congress presumed that requiring
government to make its information available to the public would in turn
improve the quality of voter decisionmaking and, as a result, the quality of
governance as representatives respond to a more "intelligent" electorate.
Similar statements regarding the broad democratic basis for open
government laws accompanied passage of the two most important
expansions of FOIA, those passed in response to Watergate in 197445 and the
"Electronic FOIA" amendments of 1996.46 Under this approach, the
doctrine of executive privilege that enables a President to keep certain types
of information secret-to the extent that the doctrine exists at all-must
give way to congressional and judicial efforts to provide essential
information to the public.47
Prevailing strains of liberal democratic political theory and open
government legislation thus share the assumptions that the publicity of open
government produces an informed and interested public, and by
implication, that secrecy caused by opaque or closed government produces
suspicious and/or ignorant masses. Openness is a necessary condition of
popular democratic power, a predicate for effective representative
government, and an indispensable part of the everyday life of the free
individual and of the wider demos. On this view, where the oversight and
accountability that should be the natural result of the American tri-partite
system of separate governing powers fail-a result that is more likely to
44. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429. The
House and Senate Committee Reports differ in historically important ways because of different
sets of political pressures placed on them during the time of the bill's drafting and passage. See
Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 809-11
(1967); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to Law, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 765, 767 (1968). I
ignore these differences because my focus is instead on the larger conceptual presumptions
that the reports share concerning the need for and likely effects of transparency.
45. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
46. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
110 Stat. 3048 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 11 1996)). For a description of how these
amendments changed agency obligations to make information available electronically and to
reduce delays in responding to FOIA requests, see generally Mark H. Grunewald, E-FOIA and the
"Mother of All Complaints": Information Delivery and Delay Reduction, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1998).
47. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 7-13, 354-56
(1974) (arguing, based upon constitutional text, history, and governmental function, that
congressional power is "senior" to executive power, and that as a result, the judicial must begin
with a "presumption against" executive secrecy); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers:
Executive Privilege Revisited 37 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law
Review) (arguing that openness pervades Constitution structure as an "operative norm").
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occur when the President and Congress are from the same political party48-
transparency must be imposed through legislative enactment. Ultimately,
modern political theory and open government legislation assume
transparency can operate as a force capable of establishing a public and a
public sphere itself, creating legitimate government and then legitimating
the actions of the government that it creates by enabling informed
individual choice and collective, democratic decisionmaking.
2. Positive Consequences
Transparency proponents also cite instrumental reasons for imposing
disclosure requirements on government.49 These consequentialist arguments
similarly trace back to the beginnings of modern liberal democratic theory.
50
The most significant consequences flow from the public's increased ability
to monitor government activity and hold officials, particularly incompetent
and corrupt ones, accountable for their actions." Additional information
also enables individuals to make better decisions in their private lives and
regarding their engagement in the market, resulting, for example, in
changed consumer and industry behavior in fields as diverse as health and
the environment. 52 Secrecy is costly, and therefore transparency represents
48. See Greg Miller & Bob Drogin, Senators Examining Quality of CIA Intelligence on Iran, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at Al (quoting the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the
increased scrutiny with which his committee would view intelligence the Bush Administration
relies upon in determining its strategy in dealing with Iran after its revelations that the
Administration, with little congressional oversight, had relied upon faulty intelligence in going
to war in Iraq).
49. In this respect, the argument for transparency resembles arguments in favor of
reforming administrative agencies to enable them better to achieve instrumental goals. See
Sargentich, supra note 39, at 410-15 (describing "public purposes," or instrumentalist, ideal of
administrative process).
50. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 27
(Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1958) (1861) (asserting that publicity is a
constituent element of representative democracy by allowing citizens to check the bad behavior
and decisions of their leaders and encourage the good).
51. See Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Skelley Wright, J.) (explaining that Congress's intent in enacting the Sunshine Act requiring
open agency meetings was to "enhance citizen confidence in government, encourage higher
quality work by government officials, stimulate well-informed public debate about government
programs and polices, and promote cooperation between citizens and government. In short, it
sought to make government more fully accountable to the people"); MARCH & OLSEN, supra
note 43, at 162-65; SUSAN ROsE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 162-65 (1999);
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of
Transparency in Public Life, Oxford Amnesty Lecture, 13-15 (Jan. 27, 1999).
52. See Mark Goldschmidt, The Role of Transparenty and Public Participation in International
Environmental Agreements: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 29 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 343 (2002); Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Information, Public Participation, and
Justice, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10784 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and
the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 662-65 (1993).
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cost-saving: as the number of classified documents has steadily risen,53 the
process of classifying documents and then protecting those classified as
secret now exacts over $8 billion in public and private costs.
5 4
But transparency also has more subtle, though equally beneficial,
consequences. It enables the free flow of information among public agencies
and private individuals, allowing input, review, and criticism of government
action, and thereby increases the quality of governance.55 When individual
agencies hoard information, they inhibit the ability of entities working in the
same or related areas of operation to provide competing or collaborative
56work. For this reason, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued,
military and intelligence agencies failed to recognize growing evidence of
the failing Soviet state, leading to massive but unnecessary Cold War military
expenditures.57 Similarly and more recently, the 9/11 Commission found
that the failure of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share
information and communicate fully with the President led the security
apparatus of the federal government to ignore evidence that may have foiled
58the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Critics of the Bush
Administration's use of intelligence to support its claims about Iraq's
weapons program and relationship with terrorist networks have especially
condemned the "echo chamber" within the White House that allowed
plausible but incorrect hypotheses and false or partial intelligence to face no
public vetting or internal criticism during the lead-up to the war.59 Military
analysts have also argued that the highly structured classification apparatus,
which depends upon formal definitions of classified information, formal
53. See Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A14.
54. See INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2004 REPORT ON COST ESTIMATES FOR SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION ACTIVITIES, http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2004-cost-report.html
(identifying that the government's cost of classification for fiscal year 2004 was $7.2 billion,
which represents nearly a three-fold increase over the past nine years, and costs to industry
regularly approach $1 billion).
55. SECRECY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT
SECRECY, S. DOC. No. 105-2, at xxi (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN COMM'N
REPORT].
56. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 77-79, 142-43, 214 (1998).
57. See id. at 154-201, 221-22.
58. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 357-58 (W.W. Norton ed., 2004).
59. See David Barstow, How White ;louse Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2004, at Al; Dafna Linzer & Barton Gellman, Doubts on Weapons Were Dismissed, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al. The so-called "Downing Street Memos," internal documents
distributed among high-level British government officials prior to the war in Iraq, illustrate that,
at least on its face, the intelligence that the Bush Administration touted as demonstrating an
advanced Iraqi weapons-building program and ties between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda was
unpersuasive to an informed audience operating outside of this echo chamber. See Glenn
Frankel, From Memos, Insights into Ally's Doubts on Iraq War: British Advisors Foresaw Variety of Risks,
Problems, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at Al.
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procedures for giving clearance to individuals to view classified information,
and technical and operational procedures for protecting classified
information, conflicts with efforts to modernize military operations and
intelligence analysis.60
An open government offers numerous additional advantages to a
democratic nation, especially in its relations to the wider globalS61
community. Transparency enables stronger, more peaceful international
relations by allowing for more accurate verification of nations' compliance
with international agreements and standards; national markets gain greater
access to foreign investment through credible government oversight and
more efficient regulation of market activity; and global environmental
agreements are more effective and are more effectively enforced through
accessible information. 2 With respect to the increasingly international,
cooperative scientific community, government efforts to prevent cross-
border sharing of scientific information reduce scientists' autonomy from
political and administrative forces and ultimately impede their independent
advancement of scientific knowledge.63
60. See Bruce Berkowitz, Secrecy and Security, HOOVER DIG., Winter 2001,
http://www.hooverdigest.org/01l/berkowitz.html; cf Beth M. Kasper, The End of Secrecy?
Military Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency 38-39 (Ctr. for Strategy & Tech., Air War
College, Occasional Paper No. 23, 2001) (arguing that the U.S. military must speed its decision-
making processes to account for both the increase in its own information gathering capabilities
and the transparency of its operations to others).
61. Numerous multinational organizations and NGOs have focused on the larger global
benefits to open government. These include the OECD and UNESCO. See Information,
Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-making: Building Open Government in OECD Member
Countries, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OPEN GOVERNMENT: FOSTERING
DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 7, 11, 15 (2003); Transparency International and the Open
Society Institute, http://www.transparency.org; THE RIGA DECLARATION: TRANSPARENCY IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE (2000), http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/23/
rd.pdf.
62. See Ann Florini, The End of Secrecy, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1998, at 50.
63. See SHILS, supra note 23, at 160-92; Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47
U. Pir. L. REV. 579, 606 (1986);J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed
Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 326-27 (2003); Secrecy and Knowledge Production (Cornell Univ. Peace
Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 23, 1999), http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/
PeaceProgram/publications/occasional-papers/occasional-paper23.pdf; cf Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, A Troubling Equation in Contracts for Government Funded Scientific Research: "Sensitive But
Unclassfied" = Secret But Unconstitutiona4 1J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 113, 117-28 (2005)
(describing federal government attempts by law, regulatory practice, and funding contracts to
control scientific information). Indeed, the Soviet Union's efforts to manage the disclosure and
availability of scientific information put both scientific progress and human safety at a
significant disadvantage. JACQUES S. GANSLER & WILLIAM LUCYSHYN, THE UNINTENDED
AUDIENCE: BALANCING OPENNESS AND SECRECY: CRAFTING AN INFORMATION POLICY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 5 (2004), http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/Bookstore/Documents/UnintendedAudience
_3.05.pdf.
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The empirical, consequentialist claim for transparency views secrecy's
adverse effects on efficient and effective government as not only separate
from, but for some, equal to, normative claims on behalf of liberal
democratic values. 64 But these two propositions typically run together on the
assumption that an open democratic regime that enables informed,
individual choice not only provides means for citizens to monitor, and to
some extent participate in government decisions, but also enables an open
society that encourages productive public and private investment as well as
65good relationships with other nations. Ultimately, for its proponents,
transparency produces an informed public, a responsive government, and as
a result, a functional society.
B. TRANSPARENCY'S LIMITS
But governmental transparency cannot be complete. Bentham noted
this,66 as do not only deliberative democrats (who have a particular interest
in protecting the deliberation process from intrusive publicity)," but
transparency advocates themselves.6s Government cannot operate in a
manner that provides complete access to all proceedings and documents.
Complete transparency not only would create prohibitive logistical problems
and expenditures (given the number of documents and meetings that would
need to be made available), but more importantly, it would impede many of
the government's most important operations and infringe upon the privacy
interests of individuals who give personal information to the government.
69
Thus, skeptics of a strong form of transparency complain about the potential
excesses of disclosure requirements while they question both the extent of
the benefits that such requirements offer and the notion that absolute
government openness is ideal.70 And if citizens are not necessarily interested
in or capable of being informed by full disclosure of government
64. Moynihan and Richard Gid Powers, who contributed an extended introduction to
Moynihan's monograph, largely reject normative concerns about disclosure as a necessary and
direct good for democracy, in part because they have less confidence than many transparency
advocates in the inherent possibilities of a participatory, informed public, and in part because
they fear the political paranoia of the margins. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 56, at 219-21; Richard
Gid Powers, Introduction to id. at 1, 17, 42-48.
65. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 51, at 26-27 (associating the instrumental and intrinsic
benefits of transparent democracy).
66. See BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 39 (enumerating instances when publicity should be
suspended).
67. See, e.g., GUTrMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 40, at 103-26 (evaluating various possible
exceptions to the norm of publicity).
68. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 51, at 18-25 (discussing legitimate, limited exceptions to
transparency).
69. See BOK, supra note 22, at 175-76; Robert L. Saloschin, The Department ofJustice and the
Explosion of Freedom of Information Act Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1401, 1407 (2000).
70. See Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION,
Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14, 15.
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operations," and if the empirical claims about transparency's positive
consequences remain unproven, then mandated disclosure may have
minimal positive consequences and no democratic value at all. Strong
arguments in favor of transparency, in other words, face significant
challenge from within democratic theory.
1. Transparency's Constitutional Threat
Transparency advocates work from the assumptions that a disclosure
deficit naturally results from a constitutional system that lacks explicit
commitments to openness, that this deficit represents a constitutional failing
and a threat to democracy, and that some statutory or constitutional legal
intervention is necessary to curb that threat and correct that failing. To
question these assumptions, as then-Professor Antonin Scalia did in an
important 1982 article, is to challenge the notion that an apparent lack of
explicit disclosure requirements represents a threat at all. For Scalia, the tri-
partite system of government created by the Constitution provides sufficient
disclosure of government information. The Constitution empowers
Congress, within limits, to check executive discretion and inquire into the
President's actions, while every election allows voters to inquire into and
reject the political branches' decisions. Because the institutionalized checks
and balances of a constitutional representative democracy lead to a
sufficient degree of government transparency, Scalia argued, the harms
caused by any additional disclosure requirements overshadow whatever
benefits these additional requirements might claim to offer.
7 4
71. See DANIEL YANKELOVITCH, THE MAGIC OF DIALOGUE 24 (1999); infra Part III.C.
72. See Neal D. Finkelstein, Introduction: Transparency in Public Policy, in TRANSPARENCY IN
PUBLIC POLICY 1, 1 (Neal D. Finkelstein ed., 2000) (questioning whether consequentialist claims
have ever been proven and asserting that they are likely to be unprovable, given the difficulty in
testing whether any given policy is "transparent" and the extent to which such transparency has
a causal effect on a subsequent government decision or public behavior).
73. Scalia, supra note 70, at 19.
74. Id. For Scalia, FOIA and similar efforts to force open government are an historic
aberration, products of "the obsession that gave them birth-that the first line of defense
against an arbitrary executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and its surrogate, the
press." Id. This obsession, he argues, is not merely romantic but empirically incorrect; instead,
disclosure of government corruption and overreaching (including the Watergate break-in and
examples of illegal CIA and FBI actions against American citizens) occurred because of the
internal dynamics of the American constitutional system. Id. This assertion is largely false;
although none of the instances of disclosure he mentions were initially made public through
the FOIA, they were the products of investigative journalism, political activism, and agency
error in releasing classified or otherwise secret information rather than the result of any natural
"checks and balances" of internal government structures. See KATHRYN S. OLMSTED,
CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POsT-AATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA
AND FBI 11-39 (1996). These disclosures resulted from intervention into and disruption of
antidemocratic acts of governmental secrecy that sought to hide information about the progress
of the war in Southeast Asia and about potentially illegal acts taken by those within the
executive branch or with ties to the President.
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The most significant of such harms, at least at the level of creating
systemic political danger, arises from Congress imposing, and the judiciary
enforcing, unconstitutional duties and demands on the executive branch
through statutory disclosure requirements. Transparency skeptics' concerns
about a vulnerable Constitution represent the dark side of the theory that a
strong, equipoised constitutional system produces sufficient information; it
bubbles under common law constitutional doctrines that concern efforts by
the executive to avoid information disclosure. Fears that transparency will
threaten the Constitution, for example, fuel the core logic behind the
amorphous concept of executive privilege, 75 the right of the President (and,
perhaps, presidential advisers) 76 to resist disclosure of information." The
Court in United States v. Nixon,"' reviewing President Nixon's claims of
executive privilege as a defense against the release of documents and tapes
to the Special Prosecutor investigating the Watergate break-in and its cover-
up, identified the constitutional nature of the confidentiality of presidential
communications in the executive branch's "supremacy ... within its own
assigned area of constitutional duties."79 To threaten disclosure of certain
types of information imperils not only the President's autonomy, but it also
upsets the careful balance created by the separate autonomies of American
constitutional government. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Pentagon
Papers case, provided the strongest judicial statement of this argument.
Harlan argued against the Court's refusal to grant an injunction that would
restrain the press from publishing materials whose disclosure, the President
claimed, would harm military operations. The Court's action would establish
new and troubling judicial authority to review presidential claims of the
75. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive
Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1143, 1188 (1999) ("[T]here are as many versions of executive
privilege as there are proponents and . . . each version of executive privilege seems to
approximate exactly what the particular [proponent] deems appropriate and no more.").
76. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 749-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that executive
privilege may extend to the communications of presidential advisers even when the President
takes no part in the communications).
77. See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1069 (1999). Rozell, perhaps the most prominent and prolific
commentator on executive privilege, recognizes the privilege as qualified by compromise
between the President and Congress, with disputes resolved ultimately by courts. See MARK J.
ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND AcCOUNTABILITY 165-66
(2002). The assertion, inferred from the text of the Vesting Clause in Article I, that executive
privilege is in fact absolute and unqualified, is far less prevalent, although not unheard of. See
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 737-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding absolute privilege in the Vesting Clause and applying privilege to
judicial and congressional efforts to obtain information from the executive); see also U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause).
78. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
79. Id. at 705.
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threats disclosures would cause and would thereby increase the judiciary's
power at the expense of the executive's.8'
Concerns regarding transparency's adverse effects on a vulnerable
constitutional structure arise even outside the heady realms of national
security and presidential invocations of executive privilege. Consider, for
example, the heretofore unsuccessful constitutional challenges to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA").81 FACA was enacted in the same
post-Watergate era as FOIA and the Government in the Sunshine Act., 2 It
requires, among other things, that an advisory committee, task force, or
similar group established within the executive branch that includes at least
one member who is not a federal employee or officer must hold open
meetings and make its records available within a framework similar to that
established by FOIA. 3 Congress intended FACA in part to enable public
scrutiny of what it deemed an increasingly powerful advisory committee
process within the executive branch that industry standards had captured 4
But in passing FACA, Congress also mandated substantive requirements and
procedures that regulate the President's and executive officers' ability to
seek advice from individuals outside government.8 5 While the Supreme
Court and D.C. Circuit have avoided the separation of powers issues that
FACA creates in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,s6 Association of
American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton,87 and In re Cheney (by holding
that FACA applied to neither the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary nor President Clinton's Task Force on National Health Care
Reform nor the National Energy Policy Development Group, respectively),
minority opinions in Public Citizen and Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons argued that FACA is unconstitutional on the grounds that it
infringes upon the President's freedom "to investigate, to be informed, to
89
evaluate, and to consult" while performing his constitutional duties.
80. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 756-57 (1971) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
81. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. II §§ 1-
15 (2000)).
82. See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALEJ. ON REG. 464 (1997).
83. 5 U.S.C. app. II § 10 (2000).
84. See Croley & Funk, supra note 82, at 464-65.
85. See 5 U.S.C. app. II § 5 (b) (2), (3) (2000) (requiring advisory committees to be "fairly
balanced in terms of the points of view represented" and requiring precautions ensuring that
their advice and recommendations "will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing
authority or by any special interest").
86. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
87. 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
88. 406 F.3d 723, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
89. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Washington Legal
Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 493 (D.C. 1988)); see also Ass'n of Am.
Physicians, 997 F.2d at 924-25; Croley & Funk, supra note 82, at 468-71 (summarizing separation
of powers challenges and executive privilege issues to FACA). See generally Carolyn Bingham
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Indeed, as recently as 2004 the Supreme Court has stated that frustrating
Congress's objectives in FACA is necessary, in some cases, to prevent the
greater harm of unconstitutional, congressionally imposed disclosure
mandates, notwithstanding the important public interest in open
government. 90
2. Transparency's Negative Consequences
In addition to these more abstract constitutional concerns, critics also
challenge what they consider to be the enormous unintended consequences
of disclosure requirements.9 ' First and foremost, they argue, forced
disclosure creates a nation that is more susceptible to security breaches and
less able to enforce its own laws because evil-doers will have greater access to
information that could be used to threaten the health and safety of the
public. 92 Congress has responded to such concerns by exempting military,
national security, and law enforcement operations from FOIA disclosure.9 3
The federal judiciary has largely adopted this preference when it evaluates
challenges to the President's and executive branch agencies' unwillingness
to disclose allegedly exempted documents.
94
The events of September 11 seem to have reinforced these dynamics of
judicial review. Judge Sentelle wrote for a two-judge majority in the D.C.
Circuit's 2003 decision holding that the names of persons detained
following the September 11, 2001, attacks and the details of their
detainment fell within FOIA's law enforcement exception. 95 Judge Sentelle
referred to and followed what he described as a long tradition of judicial
deference to the Justice Department in FOIA cases that raise national
Kello, Note, Drawing the Curtain on Open Government? In Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 345 (2003) (arguing in favor of FACA's constitutionality).
90. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2589 (2004).
91. See James T. O'Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus Between Public Access
and Terrorist Attack, 64 LA. L. REV. 809, 812-14 (2004) [hereinafter O'Reilly, FOIA and Fighting
Terror]; Scalia, supra note 70, at 15 (calling FOIA "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored").
92. Two post-September 11 expressions of this position are Anderson, supra note 12, and
Laura A. White, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must Be Able to Withhold
Information in the Interest of National Security, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 1071 (2003).
93. See5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7) (2000).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974) (quoting United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)) (noting that when "there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged," a court should recognize that the protections provided by
executive privilege require the judiciary to refrain from second-guessing the President);
O'REILLY, supra note 16, § 11.26 ("[d]eference is great when the agency asserts that a serious
harm would result from disclosure" of documents that allegedly contain national security
information).
95. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
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security issues. Because terrorism presents America with "an enemy just as
real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the
judiciary to explore," Judge Sentelle wrote, a court cannot second-guess
executive judgments about the adverse effects that any disclosure would
have on ongoing law enforcement proceedings related to the war on
terrorism.9 6 Such judicial second-guessing would leave the nation vulnerable
to attack.
At a more quotidian level, disclosure requirements also undeniably raise
the fiscal costs of government. 97 Agency efforts to comply with FOIA are
expensive. 98 In addition to the direct costs of responding to FOIA requests,
judicial oversight of agency request denials-made worse by brief deadlines
imposed on agencies and expedited, de novo judicial review-drain limited
judicial resources.99 State courts and state and local agencies, subject to or
empowered with enforcement of analogous state open government laws,
face similar administrative and adjudicatory costs at the state level but
without the resources and taxing authority enjoyed by the federal
government. The breadth of public disclosure requirements increases these
costs. Anyone can request information under FOIA's expansive mandate
that agencies make all records that are not otherwise excepted available to
,, ,,100
any person, no matter the reason. Frequent FOIA requesters include
businesses that seek the records of competitors for commercial motivations,
96. Id. at 928, 932.
97. Transparency requirements may hamper some non-governmental operations as well.
Scientists and researchers employed or funded by the government, for example, could be
forced to disclose data at an early stage of their government-sponsored studies, leading to
premature use or criticism of their work. Cf DuVal, supra note 63, at 621-25; Lars Noah,
Scientific "Republicanism": Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMoRY LJ.
1033, 1065-66 (2000) (arguing against disclosure of the working documents of regulatory peer
review panels). The trade secrets and commercial or financial information of private firms
contracting with the government could be vulnerable to competitors, thereby leading firms to
withdraw from governmental operations and harm the public as well. See Critical Mass Energy
Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See generally
WILLIAM L. CASEY, JR. ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (1983). An exemption from FOIA requirements covers "matters that are
trade secrets ... obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4)
(2000).
98. "In Fiscal Year 2002, the total cost of all FOIA-related activities for all federal
departments and agencies, as reported in their annual FOIA reports, was" over $300 million.
Office of Info. & Privacy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year
2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapost31.htm. See generally Charles J.
Wichmann III, Note, Ridding FOIA of Those "Unanticipated Consequences": Repaving a Necessary
Road to Freedom, 47 DUKE LJ. 1213, 1219-21 (1998) (tracking the enormous increase in FOIA
compliance costs following the 1974 amendments).
99. See Savage v. CIA, 826 F.2d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 1987) (complaining that judicial
consideration of "petty" FOIA requests is a monumental waste of judicial resources); Abner J.
Mikva, Knowing You, KnowingMe, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at 23 (describing the administrative
burden of FOIA enforcement on federal district courts).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (A) (2000).
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individuals seeking personal and family records from the Social Security
Administration for genealogical research, or litigants attempting to
circumvent discovery rules in suits against the government.' °  One
unintended consequence of transparency, then, is the transfer of wealth
between corporations inside as well as outside of the United States when
competitors and foreign governments obtain information about American
industry that is submitted to or collected by the government.""
Transparency also harms government decisionmaking by adversely
affecting the ability of government officials to deliberate over policy matters
outside of the public eye, and by curbing or skewing the production of
informational goods. Disclosure of documents prepared by government
officials may inhibit a president and agency decisionmakers from receiving
candid, objective, and knowledgeable advice from subordinates.0 3 Closed
deliberations enable policymakers to make more thoughtful consideration
of the available information and the relative advantages of alternatives, to
engage in more fulsome and substantive debate over the most popular and
unpopular alternatives regarding even the most passionate public issues, and
to bargain openly in order to reach a widely acceptable and optimal result,
without the inevitable pressure that accompanies public scrutiny.1
0 4
101. See Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: A "Prologue
to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both," 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1184 (1995); Chuck McCutcheon,
Demand for Public Information Is Surging, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2005,
http://www.newhouse.com/archive/mccutcheon0308O5.html. A Heritage Foundation
investigation of the logs kept by four federal agencies of the requests they received for
information under FOIA during the first six months of 2001 revealed that only a small
percentage came from journalists and private individuals. Instead, the majority of requests came
from individuals identifying themselves as attorneys and from corporations. See Mark Tapscott &
Nicole Taylor, Special Report: Few Journalists Use the Federal Freedom of Information Act,
http://www.hefitage.org/Press/MediaCenter/FOIA.cfm.
102. See O'Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror, supra note 91, at 813.
103. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("If presidential advisers
must assume they will be held to account publicly for all approaches that were advanced,
considered but ultimately rejected, they will almost inevitably be inclined to avoid serious
consideration of novel or controversial approaches to presidential problems.").
104. See BOK, supra note 22, at 175-76; David M. Welborn et al., Background Report for
Recommendation 84-3: Implementation and Effects of the Federal Government in the Sunshine Act, in
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, at 199, 235-39 (1984); Michael A. Lawrence, Finding Shade
from the "Government in the Sunshine Act": A Proposal to Permit Private Informal Background
Discussions at the United States International Trade Commission, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1995);
James T. O'Reilly & Gracia M. Berg, Stealth Caused by Sunshine: How Sunshine Act Interpretation
Results in Less Information for the Public About the Decision-Making Process of the International Trade
Commission, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 425, 458 (1995) (arguing that closing particular types of ITC
deliberations would lead to better deliberation and would, as a result, better promote public
understanding of Commission decisions); Vermeule, supra note 9, at 412-13. Courts often
affirm this belief, perhaps based on their own practice of closed deliberations and conferences.
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) ("Human experience teaches that
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern
for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.").
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Anecdotal complaints about open meeting laws suggest that agencies subject
to these laws hold fewer meetings; engage in a constrained, less-informed
dialogue when they meet; are vulnerable to greater domination by those
who possess greater communications skills and self-confidence, no matter
the quality of their ideas; and lose the potential for informal, creative debate
that chance or planned meetings outside of the public eye enable. °5
For agencies seeking to control the information they produce, laws
protecting against the disclosure of government information offer a second-
best alternative to a regime in which government could own and prohibit,
via property right, the unauthorized circulation of information. 10 6 The
protections provided to private parties by intellectual property law are
intended in part to create incentives for the production of socially beneficial
information. 1°7 Government efforts to maintain some information as secret
are in some ways analogous, insofar as they assume that a privilege against
disclosure allows the production of more and better information and better10s
governance. Just as creativity and innovation in the sciences and arts are
adversely affected by a legal regime that under-protects intellectual property,
so the amount of information produced by government and the quality of its
One example of the negative unintended consequences of the wide application of
open government laws to all public agencies is its effect on public universities. Many public
universities must comply with state open records and open meetings acts during their searches
for high level administrators, thereby both raising the costs of conducting the search and
suppressing the pool of applicants to those willing to be involved in a public search. See generally
Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934, 939 (Fla. 1983) (demonstrating that state sunshine laws apply
to search for law school dean and cover all aspects of search committee's collective inquiries
and discussion of candidates); Nick Estes, State University Presidential Searches: Law and Practice, 26
J.C. & U.L. 485, 502-08 (2000) (surveying relevant state statutes and discussing the costs of
open-ended transparency requirements on universities).
105. See Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the Mountaintop,
53 DRAKE L. REv. 11, 22-24 (2004); Joseph W. Little & Thomas Tompkins, Open Government
Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C. L. REV. 451, 452 (1975); Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the
Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 473, 481-85 (1997); Randolph J. May, Taming the Sunshine Act; Too Much Exposure
Inhibits CollegialDecision Making, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 24.
106. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 242 (1981) (noting that two
methods for protecting information are by creating property rights in information and by
secrecy).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting power to Congress in the patent and
copyright clause "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . "); ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10 (3d ed. 2003)
("Intellectual property in the United States is fundamentally about incentives to invent and
create.").
108. This is a key assumption when courts find constitutional protection for executive
secrecy. See, e.g., Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 ("Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances
and for their own interests to the detriment of decisionmaking process."); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936) (recognizing advantages of executive
secrecy in foreign affairs).
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decision-making are harmed when disclosure requirements become too
rigorous. In addition, by enabling executive agencies to keep information
from becoming an easily circulated and appropriable public good, secrecy
allows better governmental decision-making and more effective nationale 109
security protections and law enforcement. Viewed this way, transparency's
limits enable a functioning democracy.
II. TRANSPARENCY'S BALANCE
Considered together, the democratic and consequentialist arguments in
favor of and against strong-form transparency share certain assumptions.
They each assume an opposition between the public state and its private
citizenry, and that for democracy to function, this opposition must be
managed and, where possible, dissolved. They also agree that in its acts of
governing, the state produces information, whether in the form of written
texts (e.g., records) or practices (e.g., meetings), that exposes and explains
its actions; that government would by default keep at least some significant
portion of that information from the public; and that government can
control access to its information. For proponents of strong-form
transparency, these assumptions constitute a problem that disclosure law
and policy must solve; for transparency skeptics (or weak-form transparency
advocates), these assumptions constitute a system of government and a set of
norms and practices that any disclosure law or policy must protect. Put
another way, proponents and skeptics disagree about the normative and
109. On the relationship between secrecy and the "public domain" status of government-
produced information, see Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on
the Government's Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 91,123-38 (2003).
This consequentialist assumption parallels that in intellectual property law regarding
the benefits of property rights protection for the production of intellectual goods. Consider, for
example, the conflicts over the availability of presidential papers. Former presidents typically
want property rights over their presidential materials in order to control access to them and
shape their historical record, but they can no longer do so after passage of the Presidential
Records Act of 1978 ("PRA"). See Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, § 2, 92
Stat. 2523, 2534 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000)) (providing that "[tihe
United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and control of
Presidential records"). On the history of the PRA, see generally Carl Bretscher, The President and
Judicial Review Under the Records Act, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1477 (1992); Carl McGowan,
Presidents and Their Papers, 68 MINN. L. REv. 409, 416 (1983). In response and in order to
provide greater control by the current and former Presidents over historical materials,
President George W. Bush, by executive order, has granted the incumbent and former
Presidents veto power over access to presidential records. See Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed.
Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001). See generally Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular
Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control
of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 651 (2003); Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, but
Not Out of Mind: How Executive Order 13,233 Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously
Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REv. 529 (2002); Stephen H. Yuhan, Note, The
Imperial Presidency Strikes Back: Executive Order 13,233, the National Archives, and the Capture of
Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1570 (2004).
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practical effects of disclosure requirements-effects that they feel certain
would occur-but they agree both that transparency is better than its
opposite in the abstract, and that they can derive and impose the measure of
transparency that democracy requires. Together, these common principles
constitute a general approach that I will call "transparency theory," which
itself includes both stronger and weaker forms that advocate for requiring
variable degrees of disclosure upon government entities.
In the abstract terms of its debate, transparency theory allows legislative,
regulatory, and judicial efforts to impose some level of transparency in
constitutional doctrines, statutes, and regulations that at least appear to
reconcile the concerns raised by transparency advocates and skeptics.110 The
reconciliation operates as a balancing test. The constitutional doctrine of
executive privilege, for example, offers a core of protection for the President
and his advisers, but its application requires courts to balance competing
concerns. These concerns include "the fair administration of criminal
justice" and the need of defendants facing criminal prosecution for
information that might be eligible for privilege," 1 along with the public
benefits of preserving the former presidents' archival materials for
legitimate historical and government purposes."' Statutory disclosure
requirements proceed in a similar, though somewhat more precise, fashion.
In crafting FOIA, for example, Congress attempted to achieve a similar
balance in recognizing that while it attempted to legislate a "general" or
"broad" philosophy of openness, it must nevertheless respect "certain
110. Such competing, apparently oppositional approaches arise throughout theories of
government, and administrative law must inevitably operate within and resolve these
contradictory claims. See Sargentich, supra note 39, at 392-97 (identifying the "rule of law,"
"public purposes," and "democratic process" as core conflicting ideals of administrative
process); cf Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
1277 (1984) (critiquing the self-contradictory conceptual models that undergird public and
private bureaucratic orders). As one prominent administrative law casebook cleverly
demonstrates, the matched pairs of administrative law canons seem infinite and proceed in a
Llewellynesque thrust-and-parry formation. SeeJERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 30-32 (5th ed. 2003) (applying Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) to the similarly paired critiques of administrative structure, authority,
procedure, and actions).
111. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
112. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452-53 (1977). Most commentators on
executive privilege, even those who are skeptical of its existence and wisdom, admit some
degree of balance to its operation. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 47, at 356 (noting significant
role of judiciary in considering the subject matter and the effects on public interest of
nondisclosure when dealing with executive efforts to keep information secret); Rozell, supra
note 77, at 163-66 (explicating a qualified executive privilege doctrine whose precise balance
between privilege and disclosure is struck by the judiciary); Kitrosser, supra note 47, at 65-69
(offering limited exceptions to argument against the doctrine of executive privilege where
Congress seeks to overstep its constitutional powers and where the President or other executive
branch officials refuses to disclose thoroughly private information that is unrelated to official
duties).
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equally important rights" and "opposing interests" which are difficult but
"not... impossible" to balance. 1 3 "Success lies," the Senate Report to FOIA
concluded, "in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances,
and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible
disclosure." 1 4  Congress endorsed the empirical and normative
presumptions of transparency advocates that openness is a prerequisite to a
functional model of democracy even as it limited disclosure requirements in
practice because of similarly broad presumptions of countervailing interests.
It achieved these limits most explicitly in a series of enumerated exemptions
to disclosure requirements,' 5 versions of which are part of state open
records and meetings acts.
116
This dual doctrinal movement-at once surging towards disclosure and
then receding back towards privilege-hearkens directly back to the
irresolvable conflict between transparency advocates and their critics, both
of whom offer powerful justifications for rigorous disclosure requirements
and vigorous executive branch protections. The balance struck between
these dual movements offers both sufficient stability to provide a sense of
continuity in public rights and government practices, and sufficient
flexibility to allow somewhat diverse approaches over successive presidential
administrations and historical periods.
Given the trans-historical, abstract nature of transparency theory, it
should not surprise us that the balance embedded in disclosure laws
responds to historical circumstances, and that one set of arguments or the
other will have greater purchase at any particular moment.! 7 At such times,
the political party or a politician whose position appears relatively out of
favor in a current balance will complain that the balance has failed to hold,
or that the current balance represents a poor means to meet preferable
normative and consequential ends.1 8 Viewed in this light, complaints that
113. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 n.6 (1973) (quoting S. REP. No. 813, at 3
(1965)).
114. Id.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1)-(7) (2000).
116. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(c) (authorizing legislature to construct narrow
restrictions to open records requirement that are "no broader than necessary to accomplish the
stated purpose of the law"); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 247 (Cal. 1991)
(characterizing California's Public Records Act as "modeled on" the federal FOIA, with general
disclosure requirements and specific exceptions); Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 466 n.*
(N.Y. 1979) (characterizing New York's Freedom of Information Law as "patterned after the
Federal analogue"); see also Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the
Sunshine in the 1990s-An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1172-73 (1993)
(summarizing range of statutory exceptions to state open meetings laws).
117. Edward Shils made an analogous argument five decades ago when he analyzed secrecy
and openness as results of opposing historical trends that remain in play in contemporary
politics, law, and government. See SHILS, supra note 23, at 24-25.
118. At present, disclosure advocates, many of whom oppose at least some of the Bush
Administration's politics, represent this position. See, e.g., REPORTERS' COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF
[2006]
THE OPACITY OF TRANSPARENCY
shift between partisans demonstrate both the necessity and the success of
the balance struck in information disclosure laws. Consider the typical
scenario in which a former minority party gains control of an apparatus of
government and engenders from the new minority opposition precisely the
same complaints that the new majority had previously voiced about
government secrecy when it was out of power. l 9 When this shift occurs, we
could conclude that the balance between disclosure and privilege has
produced a sufficient quantity of government information to allow a
functioning, competitive democratic system-albeit one that produces a
significant quantity of fulminating rhetoric regarding excess secrecy,
corruption, and conspiracy.
And yet, the balance appears not to be working. The main parties to
information disclosure disputes-the executive branch, Congress, and
interested members of the public-remain convinced that this balancing act
is a failure. Inter-branch disputes over information the President is unwilling
to release to Congress arise repeatedly; the public remains largely ignorant
about the actions of its government; disclosure laws continue to exact
financial, deliberative, and bureaucratic burdens on government, even when
disclosure serves no useful purpose; and vast quantities of information, some
of which may offer significant insight for the public's understanding of
current politics and policy, remain secret. We have achieved rhetorical
consensus regarding transparency's value and have generated costly and
elaborate bureaucratic solutions in an effort to pursue it. But we have not
actually achieved the goals of transparency in practice.
A central cause of these frustrations, the remainder of this Article
asserts, lies in the conceptual framework underlying the disclosure/privilege
balance struck by transparency theory-that is, in the terms and framing of
the debate between transparency advocates and skeptics. The balances
struck by the judiciary in the executive privilege doctrine and Congress in
the FOIA presume that suitably narrow disclosure requirements based on
the type of information requested and the context in which it is produced
will advance democracy and lead to positive consequences while protecting
THE PRESS, Foreword, in HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON TERRORISM AFFECTS
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW, supra note 18, at I (calling for the
public and media "to push back" and restore the balance of disclosure and secrecy that the
Bush Administration has upset); Blanton, supra note 10, at 33-34 (arguing that because
disclosure inevitably loses to security concerns in the disclosure/exemption balance, the very
idea of a "balance" should be replaced with an enforced regime of open government in which
exemptions from disclosure are limited, if not abolished entirely).
119. This is precisely what happened following the 2000 election, when the kinds of
allegations of rampant secrecy that plagued the Clinton Administration were visited upon the
Bush Administration. On the Clinton era, see Greg Ferguson & David Bowermaster, Whatever It
Is, Bill Clinton Likely Did It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 1994, at 29; Philip Weiss, The
Clinton Haters, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 23, 1997, at 36. On allegations of secrecy in the Bush
Administration, see sources cited supra notes 11-12.
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government and avoiding negative consequences. This presumption itself,
based on abstractions posed by debates within transparency theory, relies on
a series of component assumptions that, on closer examination, appear both
empirically unsupportable and conceptually flawed. I turn to these flaws in
Part III.
III. OPACITY
Transparency theory, composed of the assumptions shared among
transparency advocates and skeptics about information and its capacity to be
communicated to the public, ultimately leads to laws and policies that
misconstrue the issues at stake in the relationship between disclosure,
democracy, and the bureaucratic state. These errors arise from transparency
theory's positing of a set of discernible and coherent actors and entities
involved in the production and reception of information: first, a producer
and sender of messages, the state, that can be forced to divulge information
that it would otherwise seek to hoard; second, messages, whether in the form
of documents or meetings, whose existence and meaning are self-evident;
and third, receivers, in the form of an audience or public, who are able and
motivated to understand disclosed messages and their significance. Put
schematically, the assumptions look like this:
* government constitutes a potential "sender" of its information,
so long as we impose the proper disclosure requirements upon it;
* government information constitutes a message necessary for a
functional democracy, so long as it is disclosed; and
* the public awaits disclosure of government information, and
will act in predictable, informed ways, so long as it has access to
government information.
At its core, then, transparency theory takes the form of a classic, linear
model of communication that posits a simple process of information
transmission from a source to an intended audience via the medium of a
message. 20 The most famous such model sought to enable the evaluation of
a communications technology's ability to transmit information efficiently
and effectively 121 and was subsequently utilized within the emerging field of
mass communications research as a means to conceptualize the processes
and effects of the mass media. 12 Transparency theory asserts that
government information works in the same manner. It assumes the
existence of a nascent (and beneficial) communications process that is
blocked by the state. Communication can occur, and therefore stronger
120. See generally Wilbur Schramm, Information Theory and Mass Communication, 32
JOURNALISM Q. 131 (1955).
121. See Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH.J. 379,
379-81 (1948).
122. See HANNO HARDT, CRITICAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES: COMMUNICATION, HISTORY
AND THEORY IN AMERICA 77-90 (1999).
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democracy can emerge, once the state is pried open and its information is
set free. Like the information and mass communications theory upon which
it appears to build, this model fails because of its simplistic, inaccurate
conception of how communication actually works.12 As a result, the model
obfuscates or ignores the complexity of its component parts: modern
government's sprawling, often incoherent bureaucracy; the slippery nature
of "information"; the elusive and frustrating capacities of the public; and,
ultimately, the difficulties of the communications process itself.
In the first three sections that follow, I explain the weaknesses of
transparency theory by focusing on its assumptions of a "sender," "message,"
and "receiver" of government information. I close by explaining how this
model serves as a flawed model for open government laws.
A. THE SENDER: THE STATE AND INFORMATION
The traditional account of transparency presumes the existence of a
coherent, responsible, and responsive state in the traditional form that exists
as a model of democratic government in liberal political theory. This
represents two errors that I describe in this section: the contemporary state
is not particularly coherent; and the dynamics of modern bureaucracy are
such that the state is not responsive.
1. The Incoherent State
Although the nation state retains its power as an existing apparatus of
sovereign control over geographically identifiable jurisdictions, the
"technologies" of power are themselves dispersed to multiple, overlapping
entities, many of which have no direct relationship with government as
traditionally understood.124 The concept of a unified, coherent, sovereign
state, whether in its general form as an ideal or in its particular form in, for
example, the United States, is increasingly under threat from above, in the
form of greater economic, military, political, and legal interdependence
• 125
among nations. Indeed, international regulation depends for its
promulgation and enforcement upon a combination of public international
organizations and "transgovernmental networks" that are opaque both in
identity and practices. 1 6 And the United States's federalist system and tri-
partite federal system of powers also create multiple, overlapping layers of
123. See infra Part III.D.
124. See NIKOLAs ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 16-20
(1999).
125. See JOHN HOFFMAN, BEYOND THE STATE 209-13 (1995); David Held, Democracy: From
City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?, in PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 13, 25-27 (David Held ed.,
1993); Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2037-39 (2003).
126. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and
Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 425 (2002).
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governmental jurisdiction and competencies that cooperate with each other
at times and conflict at other times.
Thus, the nation state and its subsidiary units have neither the status
nor the power and coherence that classical political theory presumes,127
given the state's remarkable, often paralyzing complexity, the political limits
placed on its activities, and the near-universal critique of "government"-
whether in the form of calls for its "reinvention" or for its abandonment. 12
This is merely a descriptive claim; whether the movement it describes signals
the possible emergence of a better, multi-level "cosmopolitan democracy,"129
a complex "global system of regulatory regimes to which locales and regions
relate in a federated system," 3 ° or a more frightening transnational
"Empire"13 ' is irrelevant for my purposes. More important are its multi-
layered, overlapping structures that appear incoherent and often conflict
with each other.
Sovereign states and identifiable state actors do continue to exist, of
course, and American governmental entities are subject to openness
requirements imposed by constitutions and laws of administrative procedure
at the state and federal levels. At the same time, complicated governmental
structures complicate the prospect of identifying the actor that contributed
to or finalized a particular governmental decision, or that holds particular
government information. 32  Consider, for example, the sprawling
Department of Homeland Security, which, as one commentator has noted,
represents an "agglomeration of agencies, each with its own set of rules and
procedures and unique culture, [which] raises a host of administrative,
regulatory and governmental organization issues that likely will take years to
resolve." 133 When one seeks information about operations relating to
127. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing
Resistance, 41 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 411-12 (2003).
128. CLAUS OFFE, MODERNITY AND THE STATE 64-65 (1996).
129. DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 270-83 (1995).
130. Iris Marion Young, Self-Determination and Global Democracy: A Critique of Liberal
Nationalism, in NOMOS XLII: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 174 (Ian Shapiro &
Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
131. MICHAEL HARDT &ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 3-21 (2000).
132. One litigation manual describes in detail the various issues that a person seeking
information must resolve in choosing the correct agency and addressing an initial request: the
agency or agencies with whom to file the request; the proper procedures to use for those
agencies; which office or offices of those agencies to contact; whether the documents may have
been moved to storage in the Federal Records Center or the National Archives; which agencies
may have additional exemptions in their organic or program statutes that would allow them to
avoid disclosure; and what contents to include in the initial request. See HENRY A. HAMMITr ET
AL., LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS 19-25 (2002).
133. William S. Morrow, Jr., Administrative, Regulatory and Organizational Challenges Facing the
New Homeland Security Department, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2003, at 11. Indeed, the
Department of Homeland Security's dispersal of billions of dollars to the states for their
homeland security purchases has not been subject to disclosure or public accountability. See
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"homeland security," then, whom does one contact? Contemporary military
actions, such as the "War on Terror" similarly require a vast number of
agencies with confusingly overlapping responsibilities. Thus, when the
ACLU sought documents relating to the alleged abuse of prisoners held
overseas by the United States, it filed FOIA requests with, among other
agencies, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice and many of its components, the CIA,
and the Department of State.
11
4
The proliferation of public entities is not the only cause of complexity
and confusion. The federal government frequently attempts to protect
industry from disclosure requirements for security purposes. For example,
the Clinton Administration initiated, and the current Bush Administration
has intensified, the federal government's reliance on private, industry-
specific coalitions known as ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers) to share security information relating to a sector's physical and
cyber infrastructure without making such information vulnerable to
legislative or regulatory information disclosure requirements.
1 3 5
At the same time, widespread efforts at the federal and state level to
contract with private entities to provide services, either on behalf of or in
place of government, further complicate traditional conceptions of the
state.1 6 Consider, for example, the effects from the increasing privatization
of activities previously performed entirely or largely by federal and state
agencies. 13 1 Whatever the merits of the military's increased reliance on
private contractors in its peacekeeping missions and in the war against and
the occupation of Iraq, such reliance makes an area of government
operations that was already significantly less than transparent even more
Eileen Sullivan, Billions in States' Homeland Purchases Kept in the Dark, CONG. Q., June 22, 2005,
available at http://www.cq.com/public/20050622Ajhomeland.html. The failure of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") to respond quickly and effectively to Hurricane
Katrina is seen in part by FEMA's incorporation within the Department of Homeland Security.
See Susan B. Glasser &Josh White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at
Al.
134. ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
135. ISACs were initiated by Presidential Decision Directive 63/NSC-63 (1998),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm [hereinafter PDD 63] (establishing the
Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protections). Their use was expanded
following 9/11. See Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (Oct. 18, 2001). On their
operation, see O'Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror, supra note 91, at 822-24.
136. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1306 (2003). Although discovery requests imposed on private contracts may be analogous
to open records acts and may be served on non-parties to litigation, private causes of action
have procedural hurdles that few open government laws require. Compare Jack M. BeerMann,
Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1717, 1724 (2002)
(analogizing discovery to FOIA), with Freeman, supra, at 1322-23 (critiquing Beermann's
argument).
137. See generally Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of
Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999).
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opaque and less accountable to the public. 38 Some state governments retain
only limited oversight over the privately owned and operated state prisons
with which they have contracted to hold their prisoners, while they shield
the prison operators from the disclosure requirements imposed on similar
state-run facilities.1
39
Congress and courts have formulated complicated, indeterminate rules
to resolve this fundamental conflict between laws intended to cover
government agencies and the increasing reliance by those agencies on
private firms for research and for the operation of traditional government
functions. Congressional efforts to resolve this conflict under FOLA have
proven largely unsuccessful. Sorting whether an entity is an "agency" for
purposes of FOIA is one confusing issue. 14 Another is the definition of an
"agency record," which the Supreme Court has defined as a document that
is within the possession and control of the government. 14 These issues are
especially important in the regulatory process, where federal agencies rely
heavily on contractors or grantees to perform much of the essential
empirical, scientific research on which regulations are based. Efforts to
clarify the legal status of records produced as a result of the agency-grantee
138. On the specific issues arising from the use of military contractors in the Iraq
occupation, see P.W. Singer, Nation Builders and Low Bidders in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at
A23. On military and national security outsourcing generally, see P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2004); Ann R. Markusen, The Case
Against Privatizing National Security, 16 GOVERNANCE 471, 489-90 (2003).
139. See Nicole Csarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections:
The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 249, 268-91 (1995); Gillian
E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1392-94 (2003).
140. See generally, e.g., Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (the
Smithsonian Institution is not an agency); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 90
F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (the National Security Council is not an agency); Armstrong v. Bush,
924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the President is not an agency); Pub. Citizen Research Group v.
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the Professional Standards
Review Organization, a private company that contracted to review Medicare and Medicaid
providers, was not an agency); Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051
(9th Cir. 1981) (the Red Cross is not an agency); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (the Office of Science and Technology is an agency).
141. See Kissinger v. Reporters' Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 135, 152
(1980). Following Kissinger, courts have struggled over FOIA's applicability when a document
was not created by, or is not currently possessed by an agency. See generally, e.g., Dep't of Justice
v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (copies of federal court decisions in the agency's
possession were agency records); GE v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 750 F.2d 1394 (7th
Cir. 1984) (company's internal report on nuclear reactor, which had been subpoenaed by the
Commission in connection with a licensing proceeding, was an agency record); Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Employees Local 1923 v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983)
(list of home addresses of employees of Social Security Administration headquarters were not
agency records); Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (documents created by agency in
response to congressional investigation were agency records); Wolfe v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (report prepared by President-elect's transition
team, in possession of the Secretary's Chief of Staff, was not an agency record).
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and agency-contractor relationship have failed, in part, due to conflicts
between Congress and the executive branch, and in part, because of the
difficulty of imposing transparency on the scientific process.1 42 The practice
of contracting with private firms even creates some sharp ironies, as federal
agencies have begun to contract out their own responses to FOIA
requests143-leading inevitably to the issue of whether records produced by
the private firms engaged in reviewing FOIA requests would themselves be
subject to FOIA. State courts and legislatures face the same issues and have
similarly failed to develop a consensus or clarity for their open government
laws. 144 For transparency advocates, the simple solution to the problem of
whether public disclosure requirements apply to private firms is to
characterize such firms as the relevant state actor with which they have
contracted, and to extend all open government obligations to all such
private operations.1 4 5 Of course, efforts to extend the burdens of public law
procedural and disclosure requirements to private entities inevitably reduce
the economic and administrative advantages that originally led government
agencies to privatize or contract out previously public services.
46
2. The Unresponsive State
To further complicate the state's role as sender in a linear
communication process, recall that the transparency requirement is
imposed-legislatively in the first instance, then administratively through
142. See Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the
New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 237-46 (2003). In 1980,
the Supreme Court held that private organizations receiving financial grants from the federal
government do not fall within the FOIA definition of "agency" unless a federal agency provides
extensive and detailed supervision of their work. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179 (1980).
In November 1998, Congress overturned Forsham by adding one sentence to the 4,000 pages of
an omnibus spending bill that directed the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") to
subject certain recipients of federal grants and "all data produced under an award" of a federal
contract to a non-profit organization to FOIA. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495 (1998).
The OMB Guidelines implementing Congress's command are narrower in scope than the
amendment's author intended, once again complicating the responsibility of private entities
working for the federal government to comply with disclosure mandates under FOIA. See
O'REILLY, supra note 16, § 4.10; Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to
Federally Funded Research Data, 37 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 369 (2000).
143. See Christopher Lee, On FOIA Front, More Agencies Contract Out, WASH. POST, June 8,
2001, at A21.
144. See Martin D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, Wen Government "Contracts Out":
Privatization, Accountability and Constitutional Doctrine, in ACCESS DENIED: FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 85, 90-93 (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L. Splichal eds.,
2000); Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public's Right to Know: The Debate Over Privatization and Access
to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 835 (2000).
145. See Chsarez, supra note 139, at 300-03; Feiser, supra note 137, at 54-61.
146. Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and Choice,
33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 345 (2004).
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information requests or bureaucratic process, and finally, perhaps, through
judicial command-upon the state apparatus, which may choose not to
comply. As Max Weber explained, the logic of bureaucratic administration
rests in part on the production and hoarding of information, and on a
bureaucracy's "keeping secret its knowledge and intentions" from competing
organizations and from the public. 147 Inevitably, state institutions know what
information they have produced and where such information is stored and,
through that monopoly of knowledge about their own information, retain
significant discretion over the existence and ultimate release of documents.
Their knowledge extends not only over the content of such documents, but
also over whether such documents reasonably fall within any statutory
exemptions from disclosure-a judgment that state institutions make in the
•148
first instance. Congress sought to address this asymmetry by allowing
courts to examine documents in camera in order to determine the
applicability of statutory exemptions. 149 Federal courts have also attempted
to mitigate the inequities further under FOIA by requiring an agency that
seeks to avoid disclosure in some instances to produce an index that lists the
documents the agency is refusing to release and the specific statutory
exemptions that provide the authority for its refusal. 150 But in the national
security context, agencies have succeeded in gaining from Congress, the
President, and courts the authority to refuse to acknowledge the existence of
information a requester seeks on the grounds that to do so would reveal
intelligence methods and sources.'5 ' When information is "born classified"-
that is, when information is created with the knowledge and understanding
by its creators and those who oversee them that it was created secretly and
that it would remain secret indefinitely-its creators claim levels of both
exceptional expertise and privilege that confound the abilities of judicial
generalists using traditional judicial procedures in applying generally
applicable legislative enactments.
152
147. 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 992
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
148. See Vaughn, supra note 38, at xv.
149. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B) (2000).
150. It is called a "Vaughn Index," after the D.C. Circuit decision in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.1973). Seegenerally O'REILLY, supra note 16, § 8.11.
151. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1)-(3) (2000) (authorizing agencies to treat records as not
subject to FOIA at all if disclosure of the existence of the records "could reasonably be expected
to interfere with [law] enforcement proceedings"); Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 245-47 (7th
Cir. 2004) (upholding the CIA's refusal to acknowledge the existence of information that may
impact intelligence operations and national security); Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed. Reg.
15315 (Mar. 28, 2003) (authorizing agencies to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of
requested records "whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified").
152. See Aviam Soifer, Born Classified, Born Free: An Essay for Henry Schwarzschild, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1369, 1385 (1998).
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In short, the sprawling, multi-headed state must, to an extent, police
itself. As Weber argued, bureaucratization is an optimal process for carrying
out specialized "administrative functions according to purely objective
considerations.'15 Given its role as the producer and, under disclosure
requirements, the initial sender of information, the bureaucratic state
inevitably retains significant authority over the production and storage of
government information. In bureaucratic organizations, information
enables its holder to perform his or her functions-often more effectively by
virtue of keeping that information from others-and to amass power.154
Bureaucracy's relationship to democracy and popular rule in the modern
state is thus contradictory: a democracy may simultaneously desire a
functional bureaucracy despite the bureaucratic production of secrets while
it also attempts to impede the bureaucracy's growth, in part out of fear that
these secrets disrupt popular rule. 155 In short, efforts to stop bureaucratic
secrecy or to impose disclosure requirements to mitigate it run counter to
the necessary and inevitable dynamics of the bureaucratic state, as well as its
resistance to change. 56 In its multiple forms, the state may indeed produce
messages, but characterizing the state as an actual, willing, or even
acquiescent "sender" of its information under current government
disclosure laws misunderstands the operations of the modern state
apparatus. In the words of sociologist David Beetham, "[o]penness is the
keystone of democratic politics, but proposals to achieve it are likely to prove
insufficient when they take no account of the pressures causing secretiveness
in the first place."
5 1
B. THE MESSAGE: GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
The traditional account of transparency presumes that the message or
text of government information is discernible and can be transmitted in the
form in which it was produced by the sender. This represents two errors: it
153. 2 WEBER, supra note 147, at 975.
154. See id. at 992; see also Stanton K. Tefft, Secrecy, Disclosure and Social Theory, in SECRECY: A
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTrIVE 35, 36-37 (Stanton K. Tefft ed., 1980) (positing existence of a
"secrecy process" in which "insiders" use means to conceal information that outsiders try to
obtain).
155. See WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY OF MAX WEBER 110
(1989); 3 WEBER, supra note 147, at 988, 990-92; Sheldon Wolin, Max Weber: Legitimation,
Method, and the Politics of Theory, 9 POL. THEORY 401, 412 (1981).
156. This resistance is often to any external command to change, even if the command is to
protect more secrets. A U.S. General Accounting Office survey of FOIA officers at twenty-five
federal agencies found that less than a third of them had perceived significant change resulting
from a command issued by Attorney General Ashcroft two years earlier to be more hesitant to
disclose information on a discretionary basis. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICY 2
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-981.
157. DAVID BEETHAM, BUREAUCRACY 101 (2d ed. 1996).
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assumes the existence of a message outside of the context of government
disclosure laws themselves, and it assumes the possibility of that message's
transmission without distortion or effect. Instead, any "message" that
government information comprises is produced and only exists within a
political and regulatory framework that shapes its creation and only
circulates within a mediated environment that reshapes it in the process of
making it available.
1. Government Information Does Not Exist
Just as the extent of intellectual property protection structures the kinds
of research and creativity that individuals and institutions undertake, 5 s so
the rules of open government that exempt certain types of information from
disclosure lead officials and agencies to behave in particular ways when they
prefer to keep their conduct or the information they produce secret.
159
Scholars have long known that governmental bodies will shift decision-
160making processes in response to open government requirements.
Producers or custodians of information shift the medium, classification, or
content of information they prefer to keep secret towards the safe harbors
provided under the exceptions to disclosure laws. Thus, for example,
members of a legislative or regulatory body subject to open meetings and
public records laws may communicate with each other or meet by means
(such as by person-to-person oral communications or in less than a quorum)
such that the "information" they produce falls outside the ambit of
applicable state transparency requirements.
1 6
'
Similarly, the tendency of those with original and derivative
classification authority to overclassify documents demonstrates the regular
practice of disclosure avoidance. 162 Agencies widely delegate to mid-level
158. SeeJAMEs BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOEIWARE, AND SPLEENS 13 (1996).
159. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 2, at 814 (arguing that officials who fear disclosure
requirements are less likely to air dissenting views, will not memorialize their views, will have
their views discounted even if they are communicated orally because they are not memorialized,
and their views will not become part of government's institutional memory); Turley, supra note
13, at 209 (predicting that, as a result of adverse executive privilege decisions during the
Clinton Administration, the conduct of White House meetings was likely to change, as was the
willingness of staff to take notes during meetings).
160. See ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 142 (1922).
161. State open meetings laws take a variety of approaches to the issue of what constitutes a
"meeting" to which sunshine laws apply. Some state legislation sweeps broadly and prohibits any
meeting between two or more members of a public body without public notice and access,
while other states define a "meeting" narrowly to encompass only those gatherings where a
quorum is present to discuss official business. See ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, OPEN MEETINGS LAWS
§ 6.6 (2d ed. 2000).
162. See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, at 7-8; Wells, supra note 10, at
1201-02; Edward L. Xanders, A Handyman's Guide to Fixing National Security Leaks: An Analytical
Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information, 5 J.L. &
POL. 759, 768-69 (1989). Classification decisions are governed by Executive Order. See Exec.
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managers the authority to classify information within categories that restrict
public access. 63 A 1997 congressional commission estimated that a total of
three million government and industry employees have authority to limit
public access to government documents.' 64 At the same time, safely
classifying a document requires little more than fitting some of the
document's information within one of the broad and vague categories
provided by the Executive Order establishing the classification system. 65 For
documents at the margins of the definition of classification, numerous
factors come into play in the decision to classify, including risk aversion,
166
167168
political gain, or a desire to cover up government incompetence.
According to recent testimony before a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Counterintelligence and Security, misclassification is the result of
government officials who misunderstand classification requirements, fail to
declassify data that is no longer sensitive, and ignore the needs or interests
of the public.169 At bottom, overclassification represents a bureaucratic
tendency-perhaps intentional, perhaps merely by default-to utilize legal
Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003) (providing the current standards,
authority, categories, and duration by which information may classified); Wells, supra note 10,
at 1198-99.
163. Nearly 4,000 federal officials have the delegated authority to "stamp a document 'top
secret,' 'secret' or 'confidential' under multiple sets of complex rules." See Michael J. Sniffen,
'Secrets' Perplex Panel; Classified Data Growing to Include 'Comically Irrelevant, 'WASH. POST, Sept. 3,
2004, at A17. Agencies as diverse as the Departments of Transportation and Agriculture
delegate such authority widely among administrators. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 2819 (Jan. 18, 2005)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1) (delegating the authority to designate information as
"Sensitive Security Information" to all administrators and the general counsel of the
Department of Transportation); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DEPARTMENTAL REGULATION No. 3440-
002 (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/directives/files/dr/DR3440-002.htm
(delegating similar authority to under and assistant secretaries, agency administrators, regional
directors, office directors, and heads of field establishments).
164. See MOYNIHAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 55, at 31. Those with so-called "derivative"
classification authority perform the vast majority of classification actions. See id. (citing the
figure of ninety-four percent of classification actions over a six-year period prior to the report).
165. See id. at 21-22.
166. See id. at 19 (calling for the shift from a "risk avoidance approach to security
[classification], which seeks to anticipate all risks in the protection of assets, [to] a risk
management approach, which seeks to concentrate limited resources on those assets the loss of
which would have the most profound effect on the national security"); Saloschin, supra note 69,
at 1406 (noting tendency of government attorneys and agency managers to prefer non-
disclosure in order to protect institutions and clients).
167. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the Cycle of
Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 336 (1994).
168. See Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25
(noting, as a former Solicitor General who had defended the government's attempt to suppress
the Pentagon Papers, that "there is massive overclassification and that the principal concern of
the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one
sort or another").
169. See Sniffen, supra note 163, at A17.
91 IOWA LA WREVIEW
tools to protect information from disclosure. Tellingly, the inadvertent
release of classified documents is far rarer than the inadvertent classification
of information that does not warrant protection.'
70
When an agency or an individual government official prefers to protect
information from disclosure, then the agency or official is more likely to
produce it in a form, circulate it by a method, and/or maintain or destroy it
so that the information will either fall outside disclosure requirements or
avoid detection. Although no legal (or illegal) form or method of resisting
disclosure is foolproof, the very attempt demonstrates the fact that
communications technologies are substitutable, enabling a potential
producer or sender of information to choose a method of communication
that would enable greater control over the information's circulation. If the
form of government information is fungible and officials and agencies are
likely to resist disclosure, then no essential thing called "government
information" exists that can be perfectly regulated to achieve transparency.
2. Government Information Has No Meaning
Transparency theory presumes that the intent of the government as
author, as well as the political and bureaucratic significance of any piece of
government information, is manifest in its text. This presumption ignores
the complexity of "signification" or meaning-making, the processes by which
any document or oral communication can be said to communicate to, and
have significance for, an audience."' Communicative messages are subject to
formal and informal rules of language, as well as to the generic and
conventional structures through which, for example, bureaucracies
170. To illustrate, according to a recently declassified Department of Energy study, fewer
than 1,600 of the 1.36 million pages of data related to nuclear weapons that had been publicly
released by military departments between 1995 and 1999 contained information classified as
"restricted data" or "formerly restricted data." See OFFICE OF CLASSIFICATION AND INFO.
CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON INADVERTENT RELEASES OF RESTRICTED
DATA AND FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,951, DOE/SO-10-0015
(Oct. 2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/inadvertentl5.pdf (Deleted Version). In
fact, the vast majority of inadvertently released classified data should not have been classified in
the first place. Id. at 1-2.
171. By "signification," I refer not only to the term's initial use within semiotics as a process
of meaning creation. See generally Paul Perron, Semiotics, in THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO
LITERARY THEORY & CRITICISM 658 (Michael Groden & Martin Kreisworth eds., 1994).
Signification is also the concept of meaning production that has since been taken up by
virtually all structuralist and poststructuralist literary and cultural theories. See MODERN
CRITICISM AND THEORY: A READER 1 (David Lodge ed., 1988) (introducing an excerpt from
Ferdinand de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics and noting its pervasive influence in
literary criticism and theory); Richard Johnson, What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?, in WHAT IS
CULTURAL STUDIES? A READER 76, 96-98 (John Storey ed., 1996) (noting role of semiotics and
theories of the text in the development of cultural studies). For a thorough introduction to
semiotics, see Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REv. 621, 626-
45 (2004).
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operate.1 7 2 Hermeneutic, structuralist, and poststructuralist theories of
textual interpretation have destabilized notions that the "text" exists
somewhere apart from the interpretive moment; rather, the text, in its
multiple meanings, emerges from the social, institutional, historical,
intertextual, and discursive context within which the reader engages with
it.1
7 3
Administrative agencies communicate through a variety of highly
structured events and types of documents-noticed and open meetings,
notices of proposed rulemakings, official memoranda, informal electronic
correspondence, and the like-that themselves operate within certain
statutory rules and historical norms, and that in turn condition the form in
which government information appears. The moments in which a
government official or other individual encodes a written or spoken
statement that becomes government information and the moments in which
that information is disclosed and then decoded by members of the public
are separate and distinct. There is no necessary correspondence between the
official or officials who create and then write or speak "government
information" and the public that may receive it; therefore, the
communicative text, the document or meeting that contains "government
information," is not a static thing with a stable meaning.7 4 Given the
complex process of translating data and information between institutional
contexts and the different historical and social contexts of the text's
production and its interpretation, "government information" has no pure,
essential form.'
m5
Transparency theory not only fails to consider the problem of the text,
it also ignores the effects of information's transmission and distribution.
7 6
The technologies and institutions of mass communications-from print to
electronic to broadcast to digital media, from major daily newspapers to
cable and network television news shows to informational and explicitly
partisan websites-through which people access disclosed government
172. See generally Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE 129 (Stuart
Hall et al. eds., 1980).
173. To avoid the pain of an exceedingly long footnote, I offer TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION chs. 2-4 (2d ed. 1996), as a general introduction to the last century
of humanistic theories of interpretation. Legal scholarship has incorporated such theories,
most typically for purposes of explaining the difficulty of judicial interpretation. See generally
Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of PostmodernJurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996); Nouri
Gana, Beyond the Pale: Toward an Exemplary Relationship Between the Judge and the Literary Critic, 15
LAW & LITERATURE 313, 327 (2003); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its
Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992).
174. See Hall, supra note 172, at 131, 136.
175. See Steven Mailloux, Interpretation, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY 121 (Frank
Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 1st ed. 1990).
176. The original model of linear communication, which focused on solving the
engineering problems of distance and mass communications, considered the technological
issues of transmission and reception. See Shannon, supra note 121, at 380.
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information affect the message contained therein and its interpretation.
One need not go to McLuhanesque lengths 177 to recognize that individual
media technologies shape the form that messages take and establish distinct
dynamics in the relationships between sender and receiver."7 At the same
time, media institutions play enormously important roles as gatekeepers of
information that select and present news within organizational, professional,
economic, and ideological constraints. 179 Consider the incentive and
institutional structures within which the press and its employees operate.
Media companies and their employees seek financial gain, compete with
each other, attempt to further political objectives, and strive to meet
professional goals of achievement. These objectives, and the discipline that
attempting to meet them imposes, may in some instances lead news
organizations to serve as a conduit of information that would help create an
informed, deliberative public. But more often, they will incline the media
towards creating and finding political scandal rather than focusing on and
explaining political issues and development, s° and towards producing
depoliticized, risk-averse, and entertainment-focused content. 1
Contemporary politicians and officials recognize these tendencies and
exploit them by strategically disclosing "information" through coordinated
public relations campaigns that produce pre-packaged, tightly controlled
"news." 182
177. I refer here to a strain of technological determinism associated with the Canadian
media theorist Marshall McLuhan. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964) ("[T]he medium is the message.").
178. I make this claim in a limited fashion, not to posit the dawning of a revolutionary new
"information society" where digitization and the Internet offer a vastly new universe, but as a
more humble, commonsensical claim that a text's medium (print, sound, motion picture, and
the like), its means of transmission (physical in the case of print or projected film, or using
limited-spectrum or high-bandwidth capacity), and the potential for immediate interactivity
affect the "message" that is sent. See generally HAROLD INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 33
(1951) (describing the development and impact of new communications technologies on
human society); EVERETT M. ROGERS, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 9 (1986) (identifying
significant features of new communications technologies). On the complex, ideological
formation of the notion of an "information society," see Ann Balsamo, Myths of Information: The
Cultural Impact of New Information, in THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION: CURRENT AND FUTURE
CONSEQUENCES 225 (Alan L. Porter & William H. Read eds., 1998).
179. See DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL'S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 276-305 (5th ed.
2005); HERBERT I. SCHILLER, INFORMATION INEQUALITY 43-47 (1996). For a summary and
review of the literature on the analog and digital media industries and their tendency towards
consolidation, see Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention
Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1445-55 (2004).
180. SeeJOHN B. THOMPSON, POLITICAL SCANDAL: POWER AND VISIBILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE
75-84 (2000).
181. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 58-62 (1993);
Robert W. McChesney, The Political Economy of Global Communication, in CAPITALISM AND THE
INFORMATION AGE 1, 15-20 (Robert W. McChesney et al. eds., 1998).
182. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA:
RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AGENCY ACTIVITIES 1-4 (2005), available at
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In this institutional and technological process, the texts of government
information are edited, explained, de- and re-contextualized, and
interpreted. Put in the context of its underlying model of information and
communication, transparency theory's conception of information ignores
"noise," random disturbances introduced by something other than the
communicator that inhibit the perfect transmission of information, 181 and
thereby fails to note that human communication processes, which are
dependent upon symbolic and technological means, are inherently
imperfect. 18 4 Thus, the subset of government texts that are ultimately
disclosed does not appear to the public as raw information that is ready, in
its capacity as the carrier of the stuff of government and politics, to enable
democracy and produce the consequences anticipated by transparency
advocates.
185
C. THE RECwIE: THE PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTINFORMA TION
The traditional account of transparency presumes that the public
receives and reacts in a rational and predictable way to government
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32750.pdf (listing recent controversies surrounding
administrative agencies' use of public relations campaigns); David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under
Bush, a New Age of Prepackaged News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al (reporting that at least
twenty federal agencies have produced news segments that were subsequently incorporated,
without attribution, into local television broadcasts); Tom Brune, Cadre Grows to Rein In,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 2005,. at A22 (reporting on the Bush Administration's efforts to control its
public image and message through information control); Robert Pear, Politics Can Get in the Way
of Keeping Papers Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at A9 (describing Bush Administration's
disclosure of classified information for political expediency). In two recent decisions, the
Government Accountability Office found that Bush Administration efforts to utilize an editorial
writer/radio talkshow host and to produce its own news segments without public notice or
proper public attribution in order to promote its activities violated federal prohibitions against
using appropriated funds for publicity or propaganda not authorized by Congress. See DEP'T OF
EDUC., CONTRACT TO OBTAIN SERVICES OF ARMSTRONG WILLIAMS, GAO REPORT B-305368 (Sept.
30, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/305368.htm; DEP'T OF EDUC., No
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT VIDEO NEWS RELEASE AND MEDIA ANALYSIS, GAO REPORT B-304228
(Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/304228.htm. More recently,
press reports have uncovered Pentagon efforts to produce and subsidize the printing of news by
putatively independent news organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Jeff Gerth, Military's
Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at Al. See generally Gia B.
Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005) (arguing that
for reasons of accountability and transparency, government must make its role clear when it
engages in public debate).
183. See CLAUDE SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF
COMMUNICATION 108-09 (1949); Schramm, supra note 120, at 135-36.
184. See GRAEME PATTERSON, HISTORYAND COMMUNICATIONS 100-01 (1990).
185. Even websites that merely make raw documents available in the form in which they
received them, such as the public interest website of the National Security Archive and the
commercial website The Smoking Gun, select and edit these documents and, in posting them,
implicitly (at times, explicitly) make editorial comments. See National Security Archive
Homepage, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv (last visited Feb. 11, 2005); The Smoking Gun
Homepage, http://www.thesmokinggun.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
91 IOWA LAWREVIEW
information disclosed by the state. But as with its assumptions about the
sender and message, traditional conceptions of transparency fail to account
for the complex processes within which the public "receives" government
information and then incorporates (or fails to incorporate) that information
within its resulting political attitudes and behavior.Just as the "text" assumed
in transparency theory does not exist in any pure form, so the "public" as an
interested, informed, and rational collective does not exist, either.
Transparency theory presumes, in the first instance, the existence of an
interested public that needs and wants to be fully informed. This
presumption badly needs proof. s 6 A vast body of empirical studies
demonstrates citizens' lack of political knowledge."" Summarizing the
extent of voter ignorance, one commentator has concluded that "voters are
not just ignorant about specific policy issues, but about the basic structure of
government," lack ideological consistency in issue stances, and have been
found to be consistently ignorant about politics by survey research into the
matter since the late 1930s. l1 8 Public choice theory explains this finding by
asserting that voters, to the extent that they have any interest in politics at
all, are more interested in policy outcomes than policy inputs, have an
infinitesimally small impact on political decisionmaking as individuals, and
have few incentives to spend the resources required to acquire
• - • 189
information. Thus, the public's ignorance is rational and will not be
mitigated in the abstract much, if at all, by efforts to increase the disclosure
of government information, especially given the already-existing
"superabundance" of information available from existing sources.190
Efforts to complicate the assumptions of rational actor models and
voter ignorance through the insights of behavioral and cognitive psychology
186. See Peter Dennis Bathory & Wilson Carey McWilliams, Political Theory and the People's
Right to Know, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES 3, 13-15 (Itzhak Galnoor ed., 1977)
(questioning the existence of a public that wants to be, and is capable of being, informed).
187. For a thorough examination of the literature, see Samuel DeCanio, Beyond Marxist
State Theory: State Autonomy in Democratic Societies, 14 CRITICAL REV. 215, 219-21 (2000).
188. Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 417-19
(1998).
189. See ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-59 (1957); Richard
A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 51 (1986).
190. Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information, in
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369-71 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski
eds., 1990). Indeed, the informational excess of contemporary politics and culture might itself
constitute a barrier to better, more informed political decision-making and activity insofar as it
leads to the public's inability to believe that any information is definitive. See JODI DEAN,
PUBLICITY'S SECRET: How TECHNOCULTURE CAPITALIZES ON DEMOCRACY 163 (2002). Thus,
widespread voter ignorance could be explained as not irrational by noting the difficulty for
every voter, no matter the extent of their knowledge, to gain sufficiently reliable information
about the effects of any political decision by an elected official given the relative inability to
interpret the meaning of the available information. See Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction: Public
Ignorance and Democratic Theory, 12 CRITICAL REV. 397, 408-09 (1998).
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do not change this conclusion drastically. These fields have identified the
heuristic devices, or rules of thumb, that shape individuals' judgment
processes and lead to reflexive, often inaccurate perceptions, and that
further cast doubt on the existence of the deliberative, open-ended, and
open-minded decisional processes that transparency advocates assume to be
possible.191 Candidates and political parties may serve as helpful, though still
imperfect, heuristic devices that enable voters to choose in relatively rational
and informed ways,192 but such short-cuts do not help voters to understand
and decide on positions regarding complicated matters of national and
political importance for which clear heuristic cues are unavailable.
93
Consider, for example, public knowledge and opinion during the
period prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Long after sufficient
information existed to disprove the contention, large segments of the
American public believed (and, to an extent, continue to believe) in a
proved link between Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and the September 11
terrorism attacks, in part because of the Bush Administration's speculative
insistence on such a connection in the period immediately prior to and
following the end of official hostilities in the war in Iraq.1 9 4 In trusting the
Administration's account, some members of the public who voted for
President Bush in the 2004 election, by relying on heuristic devices or
employing rational calculation, may have ignored or chosen to disbelieve
contrary evidence. But, at a minimum, they voted to re-elect the President
despite publicly available information regarding one of the central, pre-war
justifications for invading Iraq. 195 Accordingly, merely requiring disclosure of
191. See REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 7
(2001); Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction-Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT 1, 15-16 (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
192. See DOWNS, supra note 189, at 100, 210; Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting
Correctly, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 585, 594 (1997).
193. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through
Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus, "50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1160-61 (2003).
194. See Many Think Iraq, al-Qaeda Linked, GAINESVILLE SUN, Apr. 23, 2004, at 9A; Dana
Milbank & Claudia Deane, Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2003, at Al.
195. Divergent, often incorrect, views on the evidence about Saddam Hussein's regime
continued into the 2004 presidential election, generally induced by the misstatements of the
candidates and campaigns themselves. See Peter S. Canellos, Misperceptions Linger, with
Candidates' Help, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2004, at A3; Glenn Kessler, Bush Recasts Rationale for
War After Report, WASH. POST, Oct. 10. 2004, at A32; Glenn Kessler &Jim VandeHei, Misleading
Assertions Cover Iraq War and Voting Records, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004, at A15; Dana Milbank, The
Gap Between Closed Minds, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A4.
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more information might have little effect in the face of efforts to manipulate
such information through false or misleading statements.19
6
In addition to assuming the public is attentive, interested, and
knowledgeable, transparency theory further presumes that the public
understands and learns from government information in predictable ways.
But the public's pre-existing knowledge and capacity to understand
information is limited, and the public in turn understands information
within existing cultural and social frames. At the moment a text ultimately
has meaning for its audience, the receiver has decoded the text in a manner
framed by individual social and cognitive structures of understanding that
are in part determined by race, class, gender, educational background, and
the like.'97 Critiquing largely quantitative studies and behavioralist theories
of media reception as a passive process in which an audience merely absorbs
the pre-constituted meanings of broadcast messages, the ethnographic study
of media audiences has revealed that "people actively and creatively make
their own meanings and create their own culture." o8 The cultural study of
media reception asserts that the act of "reading" a text-whether a soap
opera, a television news show, or a report on the contents of a disclosed
government document (or even, indeed, the document itself as it is
reproduced in a newspaper or on a website)--constitutes a process of
negotiation between media representations and the social experiences and
background that structure the reader's response.' 99 In the formal and social
processes of reception, the "message" operates not as a mechanical signal
that produces knowledge and certain behaviors, but is instead subject to the
interpretive frames of individuals who are themselves parts of existing
interpretive communities.2 °0
196. Indeed, manipulative information control, which includes not only withholding and
selectively disclosing information, but also "spinning" information in the most positive manner,
has been a part of every modern American presidential administration. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
When Spin Spins Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at DI.
197. SeeHall, supra note 172, at 130.
198. len Ang, Culture and Communication: Towards an Ethnographic Critique of Media
Consumption in the Transnational Media System, in WHAT IS CULTURAL STUDIES 237, 240 (John
Storey ed., 1996); see also IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 170 (1991) (arguing
that ethnographic studies of television audiences reveal the "multifaceted, fragmented and
diversified repertoire of practices and experiences" of engaging with the mass media).
199. This conception of the audience is most closely associated with the pioneering work of
the British ethnographer and cultural studies theorist David Morley, who studied television
news audiences in The 'Nationwide' Audience: Structure and Decoding (1980) and researched how
the contexts of television viewing affect media reception in Family Television: Cultural Power and
Domestic Leisure (1986). On the influence of Morley's work on cultural studies, see Colin Sparks,
Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies, and Marxism, in STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL
STUDIES 71, 93-94 (David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 1996).
200. Elsewhere, I have argued for efforts to incorporate these insights into political and
legal theory. See Mark Fenster, Murray Edelman and the Study of Political and Legal Symbols, 17
CRITICAL REV. (forthcoming 2006). For efforts to do this kind of work, see generally ROSEMARY
COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND
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At the same time that the public knows too little about information that
is already available and responds actively to the information it is provided, a
significant portion of the public also believes in, and imputes extraordinary
significance to, the existence of false, and even fantastic, secret information.20• 202 203
Recent work in anthropology,201 political science, history, and cultural
studies20 4 on American populism and conspiracy theory demonstrates the
extent to which Americans (as well as members of other political cultures
with populist tendencies) often perceive politics and other aspects of public
life to be controlled by secretive groups within or outside the government.
Belief that power is concentrated disproportionately in secret public and
private elites indicates a pervasive anxiety about secrecy that feeds off of, but
does not necessarily react rationally towards the existence of undisclosed
201government information. When significant segments of the public believe
that corruption or conspiracy permeate government, their desire for
transparency becomes obsessive and their ability to rationally sort and
interpret information suffers as a result.206 Consider, for example, a satirical
book originally published in the late-1960s called Report from Iron
Mountain.2 07 Intended to satirize Vietnam-era official government reports,
the book claimed to reproduce a leaked, semi-official document concluding
that war is essential in order to maintain a docile public and an expansive
economy. Since the moment of its publication, and repeatedly over the past
twenty-five years, many political activists and conspiracy theorists have
considered the book to be documentary evidence of a soulless American
government that has survived by promoting unnecessary military operations
208
and the ideological domination of its citizens. Some readers' desire for
secret government information, in other words, transformed a satire that
THE LAW (1998) (applying cultural media studies to trademark law); Toby Miller, What It Is and
What It Isn't: Cultural Studies Meets Graduate-Student Labor, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69 (2001)
(applying cultural media studies to labor law).
201. See PARANOIA WITHIN REASON: A CASEBOOK ON CONSPIRACY AS EXPLANATION (George
E. Marcus ed., 1999); TRANSPARENCY AND CONSPIRACY: ETHNOGRAPHIES OF SUSPICION IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER (Harry G. West & Todd Sanders eds., 2003).
202. See generally DEAN, supra note 190.
203. See generally MICHAEL KAzIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (1995).
204. See generally MARK FENSTER, CONSPIRACY THEORIES: SECRECY AND POWER IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1999); PETER KNIGHT, CONSPIRACY CULTURE: FROM THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION TO
THE X-FILES (2001).
205. See Susan Harding & Kathleen Stewart, Anxieties of Influence: Conspiracy Theory and
Therapeutic Culture in Millennial America, in TRANSPARENCY AND CONSPIRACY, supra note 201, at
258, 264.
206. See Kermit L. Hall, The Virulence of the National Appetite for Bogus Revelation, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1, 5-7 (1997).
207. See generally LEONARD C. LEWIN, REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN: ON THE POSSIBILITY
AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE (Free Press 1996) (1967).
208. Victor Navasky, Introduction, in REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND
DESIRABILITY OF PEACE, supra note 207, at v, v-xvi.
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resembled a leaked classified document into real, insidious evidence of
government perfidy.
By assuming a public capable of correctly interpreting the meaning and
significance of formerly secret government information, transparency theory
ignores the powerful role that secrecy plays in the cultural imaginary. In his
classic sociological treatment of the modern obsession with secrecy, Georg
Simmel noted that "the secret produces an immense enlargement of life"
and offers "the possibility of a second world alongside the manifest world."
20 9
The actual content of the secret-the information it contains-might in fact
have negligible value, but to label information "secret" is to hint that it offers
rarity and value and may render the object a kind of fetish. 210 According to
Simmel, this can lead the public, which has limited access to the entity that
withholds information, to assume that everything related to a secret is
"important and essential" and requires more attention than the information
that is known .2 Thus, secret, undisclosed government information takes on
its own autonomous value, overwhelms the content it imbues with meaning
and significance, and affects any effort to process and interpret information
212that ultimately is disclosed. Unless government operates in absolute
transparency-a logistical impossibility-a populist public that is skeptical
about the operations of government will always want more information and
will always suspect that essential information remains undisclosed. Populist
fears of secrecy, especially those that are deep-seated and lead to an all-
encompassing distrust of the political order, cannot be sated through open
government laws.213
209. GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 330 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans.,
1950) [hereinafter SIMMEL, SOCIOLOGY].
210. See GEORG SIMMEL, On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture, in THE CONFLICT IN
MODERN CULTURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 27, 40-42 (KP. Etzkorn trans., 1968) (extending Marx's
theory of commodity fetishism to the "immanent logic of development" of cultural forms by
which such forms "estrange themselves from their origin as well as from their purpose").
211. SIMMEL, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 209, at 333.
212. On Simmel's examination of modernity's increasing promise that the mundane
surface of things merely hides a deeper intellectual stratum that the modern subject desires to
dig up, see DAVID FRISBY, SIMMEL AND SINCE: ESSAYS ON SIMMEL'S SOCIAL THEORY 165-68 (1992).
213. See FENSTER, supra note 204, at 89-91. Alan Favish's efforts to use FOIA requests to
disprove the conclusion of five separate investigations that Assistant White House Counsel
Vincent Foster's death was a suicide rather than murder-efforts that resulted in litigation
before the Supreme Court-epitomize this tendency. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v.
Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570, 1582 (2004) (requiring a FOIA requester to produce evidence that
would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged government impropriety might
have occurred in order to overcome the privacy protections in FOIA exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(C) (2000)).
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D. THE FRUSTRATIONS CA USED BY TRANSPARENCY THEORY'S FLA WED
COMMUNICATIONS MODEL
By their nature, linear communications models simplify complex,
historically situated processes. 2 14 Sharing the assumptions of such models,
transparency theory's abstract normative commitments and consequentialist
assumptions fail to consider and incorporate the complexity of bureaucratic
practices, the communication process, and the interest and responsiveness
of the public. Transparency theory's weaknesses and blindspots lead to open
government laws that in some contexts improve the quality of government
operations and public participation in democracy through increased
information disclosure, but that fail to do so in others.2 15 More specifically,
open government laws create two core frustrations: they fail to successfully
tailor disclosure requirements and as a result, require too much of
government in some instances and too little in others; and they fail to
adequately tailor the time and manner of disclosure and as a result, ignore
the specific needs of the public.
With respect to disclosure requirements, open government laws are
both under- and over-inclusive in their coverage. In some instances, open
government laws defer excessively to claims of constitutional structure or
national security, offering privileges to the state when none is due or when
information is essential to produce an informed and, more importantly,
knowledgeable and engaged public. As a result, open government laws too
frequently fail to provide the public with essential information in a timely,
comprehensible, and legitimate manner. In other instances, open
government laws impose excessive costs and constraints on the state, and in
the process, impede its bureaucratic operations. Those government entities
and officials that can more easily utilize the inevitable gaps in disclosure
requirements, and thereby take advantage of open government laws' under-
inclusivity, will do so; while those whose work cannot exploit such gaps or
who do not have the resources to resist disclosure requirements will be more
214. See JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE 31-32 (1989); HARDT, supra note
122, at 121-22; Jennings Bryant, Will Traditional Media Research Paradigms Be Obsolete in the Era of
Intelligent Communication Networks?, in BEYOND AGENDAS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS
RESEARCH 149, 157-58 (Philip Gaunt ed., 1993). Shannon and Weaver, who developed the most
famous of these models, conceded as much:
This theory is so general that one does not need to say what kinds of symbols are
being considered-whether written letters or words, or musical notes, or spoken
words, or symphonic music, or pictures. The theory is deep enough so that the
relationships it reveals indiscriminately apply to other forms of communication.
This means, of course, that the theory is sufficiently imaginatively motivated so that
it is dealing with the real inner core of the communications problem, no matter
what special form the actual case may take.
SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 183, at 114-15.
215. SeeSage, supra note 37, at 1826-28.
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open, even when such openness inhibits their decision-making abilities.
Thus, federal agencies and officials with broad FOIA exceptions, large
discretionary budgets, and litigation support from the Department ofJustice
can resist FOIA requests to the greatest extent possible.2 16 By contrast,
officials at the state and especially the local level, faced with state
constitutional and statutory open government mandates while constrained
by limited taxing authority and tighter budgetary constraints, are less able to
avoid disclosure and will therefore be, for better or worse, more transparent.
Ironically, the state entity furthest in distance away from most Americans,
the federal government, is the one best able to avoid openness
requirements, while the level of government that is closest and perhaps most
directly accountable is the least able to afford the costs of transparency and
is the one most burdened with it.
Because of their over- and under-inclusivity, open government laws
cannot always deliver the core promise of transparency theory: that open
governments govern optimally. Government changes its operations in
response to open government laws, sometimes for the better and sometimes
simply to avoid disclosure. Faced with unavoidable openness requirements,
state and local governments may operate in the way transparency theory
anticipates by being more accountable in their actions, or they may decide
to govern less, whether by choice or to avoid the financial and political costs
of openness." A document, controversial law, or meeting foregone is one
that need not be disclosed.2"' By contrast, federal agencies that face
avoidable openness requirements may operate in the ways transparency
theory anticipates, by disclosing what they must while keeping secret that
which is best left undisclosed, or they may simply attempt to maximize their
control over government information and fight all efforts to force
disclosure. In their broad legal mandates and privileges, the open
government laws that transparency theory has helped spawn enable both sets
of these variable results.
2 19
Similarly, open government laws fail to produce the presumed product
of transparency, an informed, participatory democracy, because they
explicitly ignore the public, the presumed user and beneficiary of open
216. See generally Saloschin, supra note 69.
217. On the relationship between transparency requirements in the federal regulatory state
and deregulation, see Alexander Nathan Hecht, Administrative Process in an Information Age: The
Transformation of Agency Action Under the Data Quality Act, 31J. LEGIS. 233, 235 (2005).
218. This is a version of the prescription Ilya Somin makes after reviewing evidence of voter
ignorance-that if the public knows too little about government, then government should be
more limited in scope. See Somin, supra note 188, at 446. Transparency, too, can be seen as a
means not to improve, but to shrink, government. See Sage, supra note 37, at 1707.
219. In this sense, transparency is analogous to intellectual property, which James Boyle has
critiqued for being "massively indeterminate" in its efforts to balance incentives to create
intellectual products against fears that overprotection would stifle creation and use, and in its
tendency to make empirical claims without empirical proof. BOYLE, supra note 158, at 175.
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government, and as a result, fail to tailor the time and manner of disclosure.
Open government laws focus solely on maximizing the release of
"government information," a technical concept that, even if the laws prove
successful in forcing disclosure, still leaves unmet the normative and
utilitarian goals of better, more democratic government. They do not focus
on improving the "knowledge" of an understanding, participatory,
competent public.22 ° Nor do they consider the variable needs or interests a
public might have for knowledge at particular moments-for example,
immediately prior to an election or to a particularly important political
policy decision facing legislators or governmental decisionmakers.
Furthermore, because of the kinds and breadth of the exceptions available
under FOIA and constitutional doctrines of privilege, open government laws
fail to enforce disclosure requirements in the areas of federal governmental
performance where they are most needed: to evaluate decisions regarding
such key political issues as national security and foreign relations. In such
instances, the public must rely on Congress to provide a watchdog
function 2 '-a task that Congress either may find difficult to perform in the
222 223face of presidential resistance or may perform poorly. Precisely when
220. On the distinction between "information" and "knowledge," see FRANK WEBSTER, THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 21 (1994); Balsamo, supra note 178, at 229-30; David Sholle, What Is
Information? The Flow of Bits and the Control of Chaos, in DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW MEDIA 343, 347
(HenryJenkins & David Thorburn eds., 2003).
221. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (citing WOODROW WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 303 (1901)); Sam Nunn, The
Impact of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Federal Policy, 21 GA. L. REV. 17, 18
(1986).
222. The most significant example of presidential resistance to congressional oversight was
the Iran-Contra Affair, in which members of the Reagan Administration funded a secret
program to provide aid to the Nicaraguan Contras through arms sales to Iran. See HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRAAFFAIR 101-16 (1990).
223. Congress may perform its public watchdog function poorly in a variety of ways and for
a variety of reasons. It might, for example, abuse its position and press for too much
information for largely political or personal reasons (when, for example, government is divided
and the President and Congress represent two opposing parties), or it might underperform its
oversight duties and gather insufficient amounts of information while releasing even less to the
public (when, for example, the President and Congress are from the same party, or when a
committee and the agency it oversees establish an excessively friendly, stable relationship). See,
e.g., Federalist Society Symposium, Reforming Government Through Oversight: A Good or Bad Idea,
13J.L. & POL. 557, 565 (1997) (quoting a statement made by Christopher Schroeder, then an
official of the Clinton Justice Department, characterizing congressional investigations into the
Clinton Administration as based on a "vendetta" and intended primarily to "bring[] someone
down," including perhaps the President himself); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge:
Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 216-17
(1992) (explaining how a long-term relationship between intelligence oversight committees
and the intelligence services they oversee fosters "leniency in oversight"); Dana Priest,
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2004, at Al (reporting
widespread conclusions by "current and former intelligence committee members and a broad
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the public most needs transparency, it may be unavailable despite, or even
because of, open government laws. By relying on transparency theory's
simplistic model of communication, open government laws offer only
frustratingly blunt instruments that operate only on parts of a complicated
communications process.
IV. SOME REALISM ABOUT TRANSPARENCY
To calibrate an optimal practice of open government, transparency
theory must abandon equating the best government with the one that is
most open-or, more precisely, with the one that appears most open on the
face of its formal commitment to transparency requirements. As a general
phenomenon and in particular cases, secrecy is both contextual, arising
from a particular set of historical circumstances, and intentional, requiring
224some human agency working to withhold information from others.
Accordingly, transparency's goals require a context-specific definition of
transparency, viewed in terms of specific policy objectives, system
constraints, and the costs and benefits of open government requirements,
rather than an approach that regulates secrecy based on the presumed
motivations of officials in the abstract.225 Context-specific determinations
may, at times, lead to less openness than present law requires, and may at
other times, lead to more transparency than current law and practice allow.
But they will more precisely meet the goals transparency theory identifies as
the democratic and utilitarian bases for open government law. This final
Part considers a few of the characteristics that a more pragmatic, realistic
open government regime would have, conceptually, substantively, and
institutionally.
A. EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY
As part of an initial inquiry, a legal regime intended to maximize
transparency while enabling effective governance must realistically evaluate
the benefits and costs of disclosure with as much precision as possible.2 6
Benefits and costs look roughly like this:
1. Benefits
For the public and government agencies and officials alike, the benefits
of any particular disclosure include the normative and consequential gains
swath of intelligence experts" that congressional oversight of intelligence, both pre-September
11 and in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, has been poor).
224. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON
LAw 15-16 (1988).
225. See Finkelstein, supra note 72, at 6.
226. I have been influenced in what follows by Fung et al., supra note 2, at 12-18, which
considered the benefits and costs of regulatory regimes that rely upon informational disclosure
imposed by the state on private actors.
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227to government described above, as well as the savings enjoyed by
government and private industry from avoiding the billions of dollars it costs
to keep and protect secrets.118 Although such benefits are shared and spread
across the entirety of the population and government as public goods,
specific groups, whether by affinity or self-interest, experience transparency
benefits in a more concentrated way. Some transparency advocates, for
example, represent both themselves and the general public: the press, which
has both a professional and a commercial interest in information disclosure;
NGOs focused on "freedom of information" issues; political opponents of
the government who hope to expose information detrimental to the party
and individuals in power; and current elected and appointed officials who
want to publicize those policies that benefit their constituencies in particular
and the public generally.
2. Costs
Disclosure requirements create costs to government operations and the
public in a number of ways: by forcing disclosures that actually harm
national security, military actions, and law enforcement; by inhibiting
deliberative decision-making; and by imposing administrative costs incurred
through opening meetings and disclosing documents. As with benefits, these
costs are largely spread throughout the population, but some individuals
face more concentrated costs. Elected and appointed officials, for example,
experience personalized and specific reputational costs (and perhaps legal
liability) from the disclosure of failed or unpopular policies and decisions.
Additionally, private entities whose legal or illegal input into the public
decision-making process would more likely be exposed and who would
suffer reputational harms and increased risk of legal liability also face
concentrated costs from disclosure. These latter two disclosure "costs," of
course, are likely also to benefit governance and the public. An open
government regime must therefore be able to sort government claims about
the excessive costs of any particular disclosure so that protections intended
to minimize the spread of costs to government are not used to minimize the
concentrated reputational or political costs to individual officials.
3. Obstacles to Imposing Optimal Disclosure Requirements
Optimal disclosure requirements would attempt to maximize the
benefits to the public and to the state's operations while minimizing the
operational, decision-making, and administrative costs they impose. An
effort that seeks only to minimize costs without considering the benefits to
227. See supra Part IA-B.
228. See MOYNIHAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 55, at 9-10.
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offset those costs would lead to under-disclosure; 229 while an effort that seeks
only to maximize benefits without considering costs would lead to over-
disclosure. But two key obstacles impede imposition of optimal disclosure
requirements: we have no clear method -to evaluate and compare costs and
benefits, and we have no institution that appears competent and willing to
analyze and adjudicate disclosure disputes. In other words, any transparency
regime that seeks to impose disclosure requirements must confront both
substantive issues of what to make transparent and the institutional issue of
whom to vest with authority to resolve substantive disputes.
The current federal regime of open government laws attempts to avoid
these obstacles by eschewing thorough case-by-case analysis. At present,
courts reviewing FOIA challenges to government refusals to disclose
documents generally do not make particularized considerations that weigh
the respective values of disclosure and non-disclosure.2 3 0 This is in part
because federal open government laws largely require disclosure of
everything except information that falls within enumerated categories,
which can be withheld.
It is also because of the institutional framework on which these laws
rely. Federal and state open government regimes authorize agencies and
courts to adjudicate disclosure disputes. Most public records laws rely in the
first instance on the compliance of the government officials or agency that
produced the records-that is, the individuals who bear the concentrated
costs that might be incurred by the records' release. Public records laws
typically rely in the second instance on courts, which tend to defer to
officials' declarations regarding the necessity of secrecy in some areas of
governmental operations, such as law enforcement, military operations, and
especially national security. 31 As Judge Patricia Wald, former ChiefJudge of
229. An otherwise insightful recent effort to establish a means to evaluate how best to
decide whether to make unclassified information available fails to further a disclosure cost-
benefit analysis because it ignores the extent to which disclosure might in fact provide public
benefits because it considers only the convenience and cost to potential terrorists of using the
information. See GANSLER & LUCYSHYN, supra note 63, at 42-44.
230. The most important exceptions to open government laws' avoidance of individualized
determinations that consider the extent of the public's anticipated benefit from disclosure are
in FOIA's privacy exemptions, where courts "must balance the public interest in disclosure
against the [privacy] interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect." U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989) (interpreting 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)); see also Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)
(finding congressional intent to establish analogous balancing test for exemption 5 U.S.C. §
552 (b) (6)). Agencies are required to consider declassification of documents when "the need to
protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the
information," but that determination is to be made by the agency itself and is not subject to
judicial review or any other external review. Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 3.1(b), 68 Fed. Reg.
15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003).
231. See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 679, 714-15 (2002).
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the D.C. Circuit and author two decades earlier of a significant article
extolling FOIA's virtues, 2 recently noted approvingly, the D.C. Circuit,
which considers a significant proportion of the appeals over refusals to
release the most politically sensitive presidential information, has been
"reluctant to allow private citizens access to presidential information via the
use of statutes passed by Congress to regulate the executive branch
generally"--despite strong textual arguments that signal congressional
intent otherwise.1 3 The Rehnquist Court in particular was unkind to an
expansive vision of FOLA.
234
The judiciary may simply not be the optimal institution, or even the
appropriate institution, for adjudicating informational disputes, especially at
the federal level. Whether because of courts' lack of expertise in
government claims that disclosure will harm national security or law
enforcement issues, desire to avoid significant interbranch disputes, or even
a tendency to defer to the executive simply out of ritualized deference, the
judiciary has proven itself to be a weak enforcer of statutory open
government requirements, especially in difficult, controversial cases.2 35 As a
result, federal open government laws, as well as analogous laws in many
states, fail to establish an institutional structure that can effectively evaluate
the costs and benefits of disclosure, particularly when the government
information in dispute is controversial and risks harming the officials who
236play a central role in the disclosure process.
Based in part on current but underutilized programs or proposals, I
offer some initial suggestions in the three sections that follow about how the
problems of substantive assessment and institutional structure could begin
232. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and
Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649 (1984).
233. Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of
Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 766-67 (2002).
234. SeeVerkuil, supra note 231, at 715-16.
235. See Adam M. Samaha, Executive Exposure: Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 44, on file
with the Iowa Law Review); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 61-62.
236. Adam Samaha argues that despite its proven limitations as an enforcer of statutory
rights and its unwillingness to recognize a constitutional fight of information access, the
judiciary can nevertheless prove able to develop a constitutional basis for access through
reference to foreign constitutional norms and analogous judicial "platforms" by which courts
have constructed constitutional common law. See Samaha, supra note 235, (manuscript at 52-
61). But even Samaha concedes that courts defer to the executive, almost without exception, in
the most difficult cases. See id. (manuscript at 44) (acknowledging the judiciary's poor record in
FOIA national security cases). The fact that the Supreme Court has rebuffed the executive on
isolated occasions in the war on terrorism, see id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)), may only demonstrate that the judiciary perceives
the individual's right to a due process liberty interest or right to seek a writ of habeas corpus to
be significantly greater than a general public interest in access to government information. If
the judiciary cannot enforce existing statutory rights, it seems even less likely that it would
recognize new constitutional ones.
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to be resolved, and how an additional focus on informational outputs-that
is, on how the timing of disclosure and the comprehensibility of that which
is disclosed can improve the decisions of governance-can better address
the dangers to democracy caused by public ignorance.
B. IMPROVING THE DECISIONS OF GOVERNANCE
Open government laws should focus most closely on maximizing the
benefits and minimizing the costs of two sets of decisions and actions: those
decisions made by government, and those made by the public. The
government must be able to protect its decisional process from the
interference that excessive scrutiny brings, while the public must be able to
evaluate the government's decision as soon as possible-and, where possible
and appropriate, in order to allow public input and oversight before a final
decision is made. To do so, the public must have access to not merely, and
perhaps not even, a comprehensive quantity of information explaining the
government's decision, but, equally important, the most comprehensible
presentation of information, in as timely a manner as possible."' What
matters, then, is considering how government and the public make use of
information and how best to optimize that use.
As transparency skeptics maintain, secrecy during the decision-making
process can be defensible; once the process is over, however, the need to
protect governmental deliberations diminishes considerably while the need
for the public to have access to the information on which the governmental
deliberations were based is much greater.138 In some instances, disclosure of
government information will unquestionably benefit the public while
creating only the administrative costs to government of making the
information available. Open government laws, and especially those that
require government agencies to make information available electronically
on the Internet, handle these instances easily.23 9 Instances in which the costs
and benefits are mixed, or in which disclosures would be beneficial to the
public but potentially costly to the operations of government agencies, prove
more difficult.
In such situations, both government agencies and the party that resolves
disputes and/or enforces the open government law could effectively further
the aims of transparency theory by balancing the degree to which members
of the public could make a more informed political choice in the short-term
237. Cf Fung et al., supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that effective information-based regulation
promoting transparency in the private sector requires information to be available in
comprehensible form).
238. See Posner, supra note 189, at 50.
239. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1), (2) (2000) (requiring agencies to make certain types of
information available to the public); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E) (2000) (requiring agencies to
make certain types of information available by "computer telecommunications" or "other
electronic means").
[2006]
THE OPACITY OF TRANSPARENCY
if given the information against the likely short- and long-term costs to
government operations from disclosure.2 4 0 Open government laws establish
a generalized, binary set of default rules and exceptions in order to resolve
the conflict at the heart of transparency theory between transparency's
benefits and dangers. I am instead proposing a context-specific focus on
decisional outputs that considers the value of disclosure to the public, in
terms of both the timing and content of the disclosure, and the cost of
disclosure to government, focusing again on timing. This approach focuses
less on the quantity of information available than the effects of disclosure on
accountability and decision-making. It assumes that better government
information, utilized well both by the state and the public, will in turn
produce better decision-making.
Viewed this way, open government becomes a means to improve
governance rather than an end in itself. This view in turn enables a more
sensitive and precise means to evaluate costs and benefits and avoids some of
the simpler assumptions about inevitable triumphs and dangers that are
certain to flow from disclosure. The two sections that follow consider both
the substantive and institutional implications of this approach and develop
further its focus on the type and timing of information, and the institutional
problems that a context-specific approach raises.
C. DISCLOSING GOVERNMENT INFORMA TION IN A COMPREHENSIBLE
AND TIMELY MANNER
Open government laws need to consider more precisely how and when
information is released to the public. Even if critics of a simple conception
of the public are correct and the public is generally ignorant or unable to
241sort information especially well, its ignorance may arise from a lack of
information or from misinformation rather than from willfully invalid
242beliefs. No amount of information, and no mode of presenting
information, can inform the willfully, culpably ignorant; the uninformed
and misinformed, by contrast, at least have the potential of becoming
informed and of participating knowledgeably in democratic dialogue and
decision-making. The issue is developing means of imparting information
that can better achieve the worthy goals of transparency advocates. Two
factors that transparency theory and laws attempting to implement it fail to
emphasize sufficiently are comprehensibility and the variable value that
information has over time.
240. Individual determinations of this balance may create additional administrative costs
unless a better substantive and institutional approach leads federal agencies to curb their
expensive practice of overclassification.
241. See supra Part III.C.
242. See Robert B. Talisse, Does Public Ignorance Defeat Deliberative Democracy?, 16 CRITICAL
REV. 455, 457-58 (2004).
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Most government information laws require simply that information be
made available, not that it should be useful or understandable to the
public. 2 Imposing some form of a comprehensibility requirement on
government is fraught with difficulties, from the problem of definition (what
precisely constitutes "comprehensible"?) to enforcement issues (are courts
to evaluate what constitutes "comprehensible"?). But when the state hopes
for, needs, or expects an informed public-as in, for example, when
members of the public are voting on referenda and initiatives, 244 and when
they are making important decisions on issues with significant public health
245implications -the government does make additional efforts to provide
information in a way that will aid voters. Notwithstanding the difficulty of
defining and enforcing a comprehensibility requirement, in other words,
government can, when necessary, impose such requirements on itself and
others. Government disclosures more readily produce better public
understanding and decision-making not merely when they are made
available as raw information, but when they are made available in a way that
the public can understand.
Information also is more likely to produce an informed, engaged public
when it is presented in a timely manner. By "timely" I mean that immediate
or rapid disclosure may be necessary when the information would allow the
public to hold the state accountable at crucial junctures, such as prior to
elections or during periods when the executive or legislature is considering
a significant commitment of resources or a lasting commitment to a policy.
Although the cost of information disclosure may outweigh its benefits at one
moment-especially before the government's decisional process or a
particular government action is complete-the benefits of disclosure may
outweigh the costs at a later moment. Stringent open meeting laws that
require all discussions by a governmental entity to be open to the public may
243. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(1) (West 2002) (requiring publication in the Federal
Register of certain information regarding federal agency operations, procedures, and rules of
general applicability); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (2) (West 2002) (requiring federal agencies to "make
available for public inspection and copying," including by "computer telecommunications,"
certain types of records not otherwise published in the Federal Register).
244. The statewide initiative process in California, for example, requires that before
circulating petitions to collect voter signatures, proponents must submit their proposed
initiatives to the state Attorney General to prepare an official title and summary. See CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 9004 (West 2003). The proposed initiative may also be referred to the Department of
Finance and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee for preparation of a fiscal analysis if the
Attorney General determines that the initiative measure finds that such an analysis is necessary.
See id. § 9005. Each page of a petition on which proponents gather signatures must contain the
Attorney General's title and summary and the full text of the initiative measure in a specified
font size and typeface. See id. §§ 9008, 9014.
245. See CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE HIGH-
COST CREDIT MARKET 266-74 (2004) (recounting the development of the Surgeon General's
warning on cigarette labels as a highly successful means to inform the public of health risks
relating to smoking through a comprehensible, objective, and empirically verifiable message).
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impose excessive constraints on deliberation that could be avoided by at
least temporarily excluding the public. Conversely, classification regulations
may enable government agencies to keep information secret long after any
threat of its disclosure is past-and so far into the future that its benefits to
the public's ability to hold the state accountable for its actions have
significantly diminished.
Government information laws already consider time as a factor for
disclosure. For example, "sunshine laws" implicitly focus on the significance
of timely disclosure when they require the simultaneous production and
release of information through open meetings. Similarly, the Executive
Order establishing classification policy in the executive branch identifies
various time periods after which declassification should either be automatic
or considered.2 4 6 But these are blunt measurements, requiring either
immediacy or long periods of time established ex ante. In other contexts,
statutory and common law approaches to information ownership and
disclosure provide a variety of means to protect rights flexibly based on
247information's changing value over time. The time value of information
must play a significant role in open government laws, and whatever
246. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315, §§ 1.5, 3.1 (Mar. 25, 2003) (setting
forth duration of classification and procedures for declassification and downgrading). The
slowness with which many agencies are declassifying documents makes the "automatic"
declassification requirements that were originally based on a number of years significantly more
flexible than they were presumably intended to be. See INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF DECLASSIFICATION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (Nov. 30,
2004), http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2004-declassification-report.html.
247. For example, courts have narrowly protected the advantage that being first in the
market with information bestows. See, e.g., Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245
(1918) (protecting the right of "hot news" provider from copying); NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105
F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231) (including evaluation of
the time sensitivity of information's value in test under appropriation in "hot news" context);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995) ("The originator of valuable
information or other intangible assets normally has an opportunity to exploit the advantage of a
lead time in the market. This can provide the originator with an opportunity to recover the
costs of development and in many cases is sufficient to encourage continued investment.").
Similarly, owners of trade secrets that have been misappropriated may be awarded an
injunction against the information's use for a limited period of time, either until the trade
secret has ceased to exist or until any commercial advantage the competitor gained by its
misappropriation has ceased to exist. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 619 (2005). Courts may issue temporary injunctions that are temporally limited per se or
permanent injunctions that are limited only until such time as the information becomes
available otherwise. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1974)
(upholding permanent injunction to enforce confidentiality agreements until trade secrets
were released to or became available to the public); Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371,
375 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting temporally unlimited injunction). Although the federal patent
and copyright statutes also explicitly consider the time value of information in providing
temporary limited monopoly rights over certain types of information, they do so through
blanket time periods. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000) (establishing various terms of protections for
copyrighted or copyrightable materials); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2000) (establishing a twenty-
year term for patents).
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institution adjudicates and oversees the resolution of disclosure disputes
should be authorized to facilitate disclosure or non-disclosure based on a
realistic assessment of the information's potential value to the public and
248potential harm to the government if it is disclosed.
Consider, for example, the issues at play when secret information would
be exceptionally valuable to the public as it prepares to vote or to express
support or opposition to an important governmental decision-such as the
decision to declare war. In that context, legal requirements or political
pressure that would lead the government to release pertinent information
may create high costs, but may in fact be necessary for a functional
democracy. Keeping such information from the public because it falls within
a particular exemption or because it qualifies for secrecy classification may
or may not be detrimental to the public, depending upon the particular
context and time in which the issue arises. At the same time, presenting only
partial information that fails to provide an accurate account of available
intelligence, although technically an effort to inform the public, also fails to
produce an informed public.
The most prominent recent example of both the advantages and the
dangers of extensively disclosing secret information in advance of an
important decision was the Bush Administration's high-profile efforts to
explain the threat that Iraq represented to the United States during the
months just prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.249 Secretary of State Colin
Powell's speech before the Security Council of the United Nations in March
2003 was especially significant. An unprecedented disclosure of classified
information in an effort to inform the international community and
American public about the justification for war, the speech could serve as a
model for a timely and significant disclosure intended to inform the
public. 250 As such, it was a dramatic success, persuading the American public
as to the necessity and inevitability of the war in Iraq.2 51 But the intelligence
on which Powell had relied ultimately proved faulty and the presentation of
that intelligence as authoritative proof of Iraq's advanced weapons program
and Saddam Hussein's relationship with the groups responsible for the 9/11
248. See Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 37 (1988).
249. The two most prominent public disclosures of information during the period were
President Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2003 and Secretary of State Colin
Powell's speech before the Security Council of the U.N. in March. Secretary Powell's speech was
especially significant. For the background on these disclosures, see BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF
ATrACK 295, 297-301, 307-12 (2004).
250. See Dana Priest, Telling Secrets: Not Just What, but How, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2003, at A23.
251. SeeJill Darling Richardson, Poll Analysis: Americans Convinced by Powell U.N. Address Even
If Member Nations Are Not, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003.
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attacks at best represented a negligent, one-sided, and, ultimately,
manipulative use of disclosure to persuade, rather than to inform.252
But this dramatic misuse of timely disclosures does not make the model
any less important; it only demonstrates that those who would disclose must
take the ethical responsibility, and bear the political risks, that come with
exceptional disclosures. That is, the flaws in Secretary Powell's disclosures
arise not from the time in which they were made-a time when the public
and other nations required more information to make their decisions
regarding their support for the Bush Administration-but from the
incorrect, partial, and above all misleading content of the disclosures.
Perhaps most significantly of all, the incident demonstrates the opportunity
that timely disclosure offers for the constitution of an informed public on
the brink of war-even if, in this instance, the public was misinformed as to
the direct threat Iraq posed to the United States.
D. INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF OPEN GOVERNMENTLAWS
Finally, more effective transparency, as a matter of conception and
practice, requires better institutional design. Federal open government laws
rely on the judiciary to resolve challenges to agency determinations about
the applicability of disclosure requirements and exemptions.25' This has not
worked well, not least because the judiciary has proven exceptionally
254deferential to executive efforts to resist disclosure. Non-judicial resolution
of government information disputes, by contrast, has served the often
contentious arguments between Congress and the President over
presidential and executive branch information reasonably well, at least in
those instances in which the branches are controlled by different political
parties or when Congress acts independently of the executive branch's
wishes. This resolution process has performed satisfactorily even for
252. On the errors in Powell's speech, and various theories on the cause of those errors,
see Bruce Berkowitz, We Collected A Little, and Assumed a Lot, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2004, at B1;
Barton Gelman & Walter Pincus, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 2003, at Al; Walter Pincus & Dana Milbank, Bush, Rice Blame CIA for Iraq Error, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2003, at Al.
253. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B) (2000) (establishing jurisdiction in federal district court to
consider a complaint against a federal agency for improperly withholding information as part of
FOIA); 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h) (establishing jurisdiction in federal district court for enforcement of
the government in the Sunshine Act).
254. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
255. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do
Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 116-25 (1996); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge:
Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1992).
Admittedly, the interbranch relationship differs significantly from the relationship between the
government and the public in quite significant ways-differences that make this analogy less
than perfect. Unlike with individual members of the public who seek information from the
executive branch, the President often must negotiate with Congress in order to create and
preserve a trusting, reciprocal, long-term relationship to achieve other goals. The President and
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disputes over intelligence activities, which pose very difficult political and
national security issues.2 5 But interbranch disputes between relatively equal
parties operate in the shadow of constitutional crisis; Congress and the
President seekjudicial resolution at great risk, and the judiciary faces similar
danger in trying to settle such disputes.
Disputes between the public and executive do not share the political
and legal gravity of interbranch disputes and do not lead as naturally to a
non-judicial institutional solution. An executive agency or the President can
merely ignore individual members of the public or small groups of citizens,
while the executive branch ignores Congress at its peril. Nevertheless,
disputes between the executive branch and members of the public can raise
similar constitutional issues if an agency resists requirements imposed upon
it by Congress, with judicial review and judicially enforced remedies. But
transparency theory either relies heavily on judicial review as a means to
achieve its goals or ignores the complex institutional dimension of
government information production and protection altogether. It is
therefore unsurprising that open government laws fail to design democratic
institutions that can organize and regulate information in order to achieve
the goals on which the underlying theory is based. 57 Instead, they simply
attempt to graft additional administrative obligations onto a preexisting
bureaucracy and vest judicial authority with oversight.
More effective open government laws would create and vest authority in
non-judicial institutions that can develop expertise in overseeing
informational disputes between members of the public and government
agencies, and that can perform more individualized inquiries into the costs
Congress may also share general policy goals in some areas (such as, for example, national
security) and may be equally averse to the political risks involved in high-stakes informational
disputes. See Shane, supra, at 221-22. Nevertheless, the ongoing frustrations of the interbranch
relationship, especially given the persistent political competition between the branches, and the
uncertain results of a legal resolution to such disputes may pull the parties in opposite
directions, leading either to congressional efforts to force the President to divulge information
Congress does not need, or to presidential efforts to keep information secret against statutory
mandates and for purely political reasons. See id. at 222-26. Because judicial resolution of
interbranch informational disputes strain the limits of politics and justiciability and often prove
frustrating for all three branches, most proposals for reform (or in favor of the status quo)
stress the value of negotiated solutions, whether through formal, generalized agreements over
the procedural and substantive frameworks for dispute resolution, or through a more
amorphous commitment to compromise. See Jonathan L. Entin, Executive Privilege and
Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 657, 660-68 (2000) (summarizing
arguments against judicial resolution of interbranch informational disputes and in favor of
negotiated settiements). But see Wald & Siegel, supra note 233, at 750-60 (arguing that judicial
resolution of interbranch disputes is often essential and touting the D.C. Circuit's record in
providingjust and effective resolutions).
256. See Shane, supra note 255, at 215.
257. Cf John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in NOMOS XLII: DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 130, at 75, 86-87 (arguing that theories proposing an
ideal deliberative democracy too seldom consider issues of institutional design).
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and benefits of disclosure.2 5' Such institutions must be independent from
the agencies that they oversee. 25 9 They could take a number of forms, some
of which have been proposed at the federal level or adopted at the state
level. An external institution that reviews disclosure practices-such as, for
example, the Public Interest Declassification Board26°_Could provide
preemptive review of agency overclassification, whether as a general practice
with respect to certain events or issues, or in response to public requests.
Despite passage of legislation creating the Public Interest Declassification
Board in 2000, the Board was unfunded and unmanned for more than five
261years and did not meet for the first time until February 2006.
258. Cf Fung et al., supra note 2, at 38-39 (arguing that effective information-based
regulation promoting transparency in the private sector requires strong political intermediaries
to represent those who use the disclosed information).
259. This requirement would exclude, for example, the Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel ("ISCAP"), which is composed of senior-level representatives from the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Archives, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. See Exec. Order No.
12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995). ISCAP serves a valuable function by hearing, in the
first instance, appeals of an agency's decision to keep information classified. From May 1996
through December 2002, ISCAP declassified a significant proportion of the documents whose
denial of declassification was appealed; however, its rate of reversal and declassification of
documents dropped significantly in the 2004 fiscal year, at least in part because the majority of
the documents that it refused to order declassified were considered to be of more recent
vintage (i.e., less than twenty-five years old) and as such, enjoy a significantly lower classification
threshold. See INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2002, at 9-10 (2003),
available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2002annual-report.pdf; INFO. SEC.
OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2004, at 7 (2005) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,958
§§ 1.4, 3.3(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995)), available at
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2004-annual-report.pdf. But given ISCAP's lack of
independence from the agencies that make the initial decision to classify documents, its
decisions will likely consider only the costs of disclosure while ignoring-and perhaps
discounting-the benefits of disclosure to the public.
260. See Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-567, tit. VII, 114 Stat.
2856 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2000)) (establishing the Public Interest Declassification
Board in order, among other things, "[t]o promote the fullest possible public access to a
thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record"). As of late September 2005, the House
of Representatives had voted to appropriate funding for the Board as part of the 2006 Defense
Appropriations Act. See House Votes to Fund Public Interest Declass Board, SECRECY NEWS, June 22,
2005, http://fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2005/06/062205.html.
261. See Press Release, National Archives, President Bush Requests $338 Million in FY 2007
for the National Archives and Records Administration (Feb. 6, 2006),
http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2006/nrO6-60.html; Public Interest
Declassification Board to Meet, Secrecy News, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/02/
public-interestdeclassificati.html. Hearing on Information Overclassification: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 109th Cong.
(testimony of Rep. Christopher Shays, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations); Christopher Lee, Declassification Board: Named
but Unfunded; Panel on Government Secrecy Unable to Operate, WASH. POST, May 2, 2005, at A15.
Another example is the Assassination Records Review Board, established in the PresidentJohn
F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2000), which
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Additional models exist. On occasion, Congress has legislatively
established independent commissions vested with the authority (including,
occasionally, subpoena power) to gather information and issue a report and
recommendations. 2 62  Vesting adjudicative authority in a separate
administrative agency or a department within an existing agency, as at least
one state has done to strengthen its public records act,261 may also provide
greater institutional support for public requesters.26 4 Efforts to establish
institutions that can resolve disputes and enable collaboration between
private individuals and public agencies further promise a more effective
means to establish a better informed public. Congress or individual agencies
could establish an ombudsman with authority and expertise in mediating
265FOIA disputes, as one state has successfully accomplished for disputes
arising from its own public records act.266 At the local level, collective
deliberation by community groups comprised of government officials and
private citizens has enabled both the release of more information-as public
officials begin to trust the public more and to recognize what information
would be especially useful-and better comprehension of the information
released.267
during the period of its existence evaluated federal agency decisions not to release records
relating to the assassination.
262. See Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive
Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 1437-55 (2005). The most prominent recent
example of such commissions is the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United
States, created by statute in November 2002. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306 §§ 601-11, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 101
(West 2002)).
263. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (establishing a "Freedom of Information Commission,"
with the authority, among other things, to investigate alleged violations of the state's Freedom
of Information Act); see also Robert G. Vaughn, Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom
of Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 193-200 (1984) (describing and analyzing Connecticut's
law).
264. See Grunewald, supra note 248, at 37-46 (1988) (proposing an "Information Access
Authority," either within existing agencies or as a new, separate agency, to adjudicate and
mediate FOIA disputes); Vaughn, supra note 263, at 209-12 (considering potential usefulness of
Connecticut's Freedom of Information Commission as a model for the reform of FOIA).
265. See Grunewald, supra note 248, at 56-64. Legislation currently before both houses of
Congress would create an Office of Government Information Services within the Administrative
Conference of the United States to "offer mediation services between persons making requests
under section 552 and administrative agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation and, at
the discretion of the Office, issue advisory opinions if mediation has not resolved the dispute."
See OPEN Government Act of 2005, H.R. 867, 109th Cong. § 11 (2005); OPEN Government Act
of 2005, S. 394, 109th Cong. § 11 (2005) (creating an Office of Government Information
Services that will mediate disputes between FOIA requesters and agencies).
266. See FLA. STAT. § 16.60 (2003) (establishing public records mediation program within
the office of the state Attorney General); Kimball, supra note 18, at 354-57 (describing Florida's
mediation program and that of other states).
267. ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 60, 71
(2004).
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No clear institutional fix is likely to emerge without testing at the state
and individual agency levels. But empowering an external entity with the
authority to work between a government agency and an individual seeking
information from that agency is more likely to avoid the judiciary's
institutional limitations in enforcing disclosure requirements and
adjudicating disclosure disputes."
CONCLUSION
Transparency is at once impossible and necessary. It is impossible
because when propounded in its strongest form, the concept of
"transparency" relies upon an inappropriate model of information and
communication to produce an inaccurate understanding of government
information. Transparency advocates' failure to recognize the impossibility
of achieving perfect democratic governance and a thoroughly informed and
engaged public results in a frustrating and often ineffective legal regime.
But transparency is also necessary because a state that fails to design a
system capable of disclosing information essential for a government to be
held accountable by an informed public is undemocratic. Proponents will
not achieve either normative democratic goals or good, functional
governance through further clarification of abstract concepts or the
reiteration of broad, emphatic statements about the "Farce or... Tragedy"
of undisclosed information. 269 Rather, the task for those on all sides of the
debate surrounding open government is to consider institutional and
substantive approaches that would better achieve the essential ends that
transparency theory seeks. These include emphases on substantive
improvements in open government laws and governmental compliance with
them, especially in terms of the timeliness and comprehensibility of
disclosures, as well as on developing new institutions that can provide more
informed and rigorous resolutions of informational disclosure disputes.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 231-36.
269. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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